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This project analyzes the government’s role in the commercialization of biofuel by 
comparing biofuel commercialization efforts to those of nuclear power and 
nanotechnology commercialization. The PESTEL framework is applied to nuclear power 
and nanotechnology to identify key factors relevant to successful commercialization. 
These success factors are compared to current government biofuel policies to infer the 
likelihood of successful biofuel commercialization. In closing we recommend changes to 
government policy to improve the prospect of biofuel commercialization. 
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Rising fuel costs, Mideast turmoil, and increased environmental concerns over the 
last decades have left the U.S. seeking cheaper, safer, and cleaner sources of energy. One 
potential source receiving serious consideration is algal biofuel. While a seemingly 
cleaner source of energy, algal biofuel is much costlier than petroleum-based fuels 
because of the relative infancy of the biofuel industry. The U.S. government, as part of 
clean energy initiatives, and in an effort to build the biofuel industry, began purchasing 
algal biofuel for military use. This led us to ask the question: Can the government 
influence the commercialization of biofuels? 
A. PURPOSE 
As American’s grow more environmental conscious, they desire clean sources of 
energy. Despite this demand, the market has failed to provide an economical source of 
clean energy. In response to this market failure the government has entered the market to 
promote the development of clean energy. One such clean energy source is biofuel. This 
paper evaluates the methods the government uses to promote commercialization of 
biofuels and recommends improvements based upon the analysis of nuclear power and 
nanotechnology commercialization efforts. 
B. STRUCTURE 
1. Background Chapter 
In this chapter, we developed the basis of the government’s interest in biofuels 
and the key actions of government. We analyzed President Obama’s Blueprint for a 
Secure Energy Future (The White House, 2011) and 2010 National Security Strategy 
(The White House, 2010). In the legislative section, we explained Congress’s role based 
on congressional ability to authorize and appropriate funds. We analyzed five laws 
passed by Congress specifically addressing energy initiatives. The final section reviewed 
the role of the Department of the Navy in biofuel development. We noted Secretary of the 
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Navy Mabus’s vision (Mabus, 2009) for the Navy’s role in the use of alternative energy 
sources. The chapter ends with a description of U.S. Navy biofuel operational tests. 
2. Literature Review  
We dedicated the literature review to familiarizing the reader with biofuels. The 
first section is about biofuels in general, describing the difference between first- and 
second-generation biofuels. The next section is a description of the algae-based biofuel 
industry. We looked at the maturity of the algae-based biofuel industry and discussed 
current production and costs. We described challenges faced by the algae-biofuel industry 
including the valley of death and technological barriers. Finally, we closed the chapter by 
addressing why government intervention is important to algae-based biofuel 
commercialization. 
3. Methodology 
The methodology chapter begins with a discussion of our choice to approach our 
research from a qualitative instead of quantitative perspective. We then described 
grounded theory and why our method used a grounded approach and case study analysis. 
We outlined the six steps of the case study approach and our use of the PESTEL 
(Political, Economic, Social, Technological, Environmental, and Legal) model during our 
analysis. 
4. Analysis 
The analysis chapter is dominated by the PESTEL analysis of nuclear power and 
nanotechnology. Both industries were analyzed using the PESTEL factors to identify 
general findings for each factor. We compared our generalized findings to alternate 
studies with different findings. The chapter closes with a PESTEL analysis of the biofuel 
industry utilizing the general findings identified in our two comparison industries. 
5. Conclusion 
Our final chapter summarizes our findings and provides recommendations for 
changes to government policies on biofuel commercialization. We included assumptions 
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we made throughout the course of our research and identified the limitations of our study. 








Why are we asking whether the government can influence the commercialization 
of biofuels? In this chapter, we explain the path from an initiative established by 
President Obama, supported by Congress, and embraced by the Department of the Navy 
(DoN). We also introduce plans laid out by the president, Congress, and Secretary of the 
Navy (SECNAV) Ray Mabus.    
A. EXECUTIVE BRANCH 
Following his inauguration on January 20, 2009, President Obama inherited a 
country with rising energy imports, consumption, and costs. Recognizing the growing 
dependence on energy within the United States, he developed several policies to reduce 
America’s energy dependence and charged the federal government with leading the 
energy revolution. 
1. National Security Strategy    
Published in May 2010, the National Security Strategy (The White House, 2010) 
calls for the development of clean energy technology. In the NSS (2010), President 
Obama stated, 
The United States has a window of opportunity to lead in the development 
of clean energy technology. If successful, the United States will lead in 
this new Industrial Revolution in clean energy that will be a major 
contributor to our economic prosperity. If we do not develop the policies 
that encourage the private sector to seize the opportunity, the United States 
will fall behind and increasingly become an importer of these new energy 
technologies. 
We have already made the largest investment in clean energy in history, 
but there is much more to do to build on this foundation. We must 
continue to transform our energy economy, leveraging private capital to 
accelerate deployment of clean energy technologies that will cut 
greenhouse gas emissions, improve energy efficiency, increase use of 
renewable and nuclear power, reduce the dependence of vehicles on oil, 
and diversify energy sources and suppliers. We will invest in research and 
next-generation technology, modernize the way we distribute electricity, 
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and encourage the use of transitional fuels, while moving towards clean 
energy produced at home. (The White House, 2010, p. 30) 
The president’s vision established a national strategy based on a foundation of 
clean, efficient, renewable, domestically produced energy.   
2. Blueprint for a Secure Energy Future 
In 2011, President Obama further expanded his energy policy by publishing the 
Blueprint for a Secure Energy Future (The White House, 2011), in which he directly 
challenged Congress and members of his administration to create lasting energy policies. 
In Blueprint for a Secure Energy Future (The White House, 2011), he stated, 
Every President since Richard Nixon has called for America’s 
independence from oil, but Washington gridlock has prevented action 
again and again. If we want to create a more secure energy future, and 
protect consumers at the pump, that has to change. (p. 3) 
President Obama’s efforts towards lasting energy policies and independence from 
oil are a result of decreasing domestic oil production, increasing consumption, and 
increased importing of oil. U.S. petroleum consumption increased by 227% from 1949 to 
2011. Domestic petroleum production has fallen by 42% from peak production in 1970, 
while imports have increased by 2,553% since 1949. Figure 1 shows U.S. petroleum 
consumption, production, and net imports from 1949 to 2011. Petroleum net imports 
increased at a greater rate than consumption from 1985 through 2005 (Callahan, 2011,  




Figure 1.  United States Petroleum Consumption, Production, and Imports, 1949–2011 
(From Energy Information Administration [EIA], 2011) 
To achieve U.S. independence from oil, the Blueprint for a Secure Energy Future 
(The White House, 2011) establishes a three-part strategy to achieve the president’s 
vision:   
Develop and secure America’s energy supplies: We need to deploy 
American assets, innovation, and technology so that we can safely and 
responsibly develop more energy here and at home and be a leader in the 
global energy economy. 
Provide consumers with choices to reduce costs and save energy: Volatile 
gasoline prices reinforce the need for innovation that will make it easier 
and more affordable for consumers to buy more advanced and fuel 
efficient vehicles, use alternative means of transportation, weatherize their 
homes and workplaces, and in doing so, save money and protect the 
environment. These measures help families’ pocketbooks, reduce our 
dependence on finite energy sources and help create jobs here in the 
United States. 
Innovate our way to a clean energy future: Leading the world in clean 
energy is critical to strengthening the American economy and winning the 
future. We can get there by creating markets for innovative clean 
technologies that are ready to deploy, and by funding cutting edge 
research to produce the next generation of technologies. And as new, 
better, and more efficient technologies hit the market, the Federal 
government needs to put words into action and lead by example. (p. 4) 
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The Blueprint for a Secure Energy Future (The White House, 2011) demonstrated 
the president’s commitment to the development of new energy technologies and his 
desire for the federal government to lead the innovation of new technologies in energy 
production, specifically in the development of alternatives to imported petroleum. But 
Congress holds the purse strings, so while the president guides the country’s policy, 
Congress determines when and how that policy is funded. 
B. LEGISTLATIVE BRANCH 
Article I of the United States Constitution gives Congress the power to control 
funding for the federal government. In the execution of this duty, Congress authorizes 
and appropriates funds for the operation of the government, including the Department of 
Defense (DoD).    
1. Congressional Interest in DoD Petroleum Usage 
 The DoD is the largest government user of energy, accounting for 80% of 
government energy usage. Petroleum-based fuels represent 71% of all energy used by the 
DoD (Schwartz, Blakeley, & O’Rourke, 2012, p. 2).   
In fiscal year (FY) 2011, the DoD consumed 117 million barrels of petroleum, 
down from 122 million barrels in FY2005. Spending on procurement of petroleum during 
the same time period increased from $4.5 billion in FY2005 to $17.3 billion in FY2011 
(Schwartz et al., 2012, p. 2). Figure 2 shows the relationship between DoD petroleum 




Figure 2.  DoD Petroleum Spending and Consumption, FY2005–2011 (From Schwartz 
et al., 2012) 
Between FY2005 and FY2011, the DoD experienced a 381%, or $12.8 billion, 
increase in petroleum spending. Petroleum energy spending represents 2.5% of total DoD 
outlays for FY2011, compared to 1.1% of total DoD outlays for FY2005 (Schwartz, et 
al., 2012, p. 3).   
2. Congressional Petroleum Energy Initiatives 
Congressional interest in DoD petroleum spending is expected to remain high, 
throughout the foreseeable future, due to continually rising fuel prices. In response to 
rising petroleum costs, Congress passed several laws focused on reducing government 
energy use and encouraging the use of renewable energy. Congress defines renewable 
energy as energy coming from biomass, geothermal, wind, solar, and hydropower sources 
(EIA, 2008, p. iii).   
a. Energy Policy Act of 2005 
The Energy Policy Act (EPA) of 2005 mandates that future government 
purchases of energy include renewable energy at the rate of 3% between FY2007 and 
FY2009, 5% between FY2010 and FY2012, and 7% for FY2013 and beyond.   The EPA 
does not include provisions on the type and use of renewable energy purchased, but does 
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include economic incentives including grants, income tax credits, subsidies, and loans to 
promote biofuel research. 
b. Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 
The Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA) of 2007 further revises 
the requirements for government purchase of renewable energy. The EISA prohibits the 
purchase of renewable fuels, including biofuels, from sources that emit greenhouse 
gasses in excess of traditional petroleum production, except for research and 
development. Federal agencies must also reduce annual petroleum consumption by 20% 
and increase annual renewable fuel consumption by 10%, relative to the FY2005 
baseline. The EISA also establishes the first biofuel production standards, requiring 9 
million gallons of biofuel production by 2008 and 36 million gallons by 2022.     
c. National Defense Authorization Act of 2007 
The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of 2007 was the first 
legislation passed applying to only the DoD. The 2007 NDAA requires the DoD to 
improve the fuel efficiency of weapons platforms in order to enhance performance, 
reduce the fuel logistics system, reduce the burden of high fuel consumption on agility, 
reduce operating costs, and dampen the financial impact of volatile oil prices. It also 
requires the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) to conduct a study examining the feasibility 
of using renewable energy to provide electricity for expeditionary forces.  
The 2007 NDAA does not directly require the DoD to adopt the usage of 
renewable fuels. It does demonstrate Congress’s commitment to increased fuel efficiency 
and recognizes the impact oil prices have on the operation of the DoD. 
d. National Defense Authorization Act of 2009 
The 2009 NDAA requires the DoD to consider the requirements for, and 
vulnerability of, fuel logistics during force planning and analysis. It also requires the 
establishment of fuel efficiency key performance parameters (KPPs) in the development 
or modification of existing systems. Finally, it requires that life-cycle cost analysis for 
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new systems include calculation of the fully burdened cost of fuel and an analysis of 
alternative fuels during acquisition program design.   
The 2009 NDAA reconfirms congressional desire for a more fuel-efficient 
DoD. The establishment of formal fuel efficiency KPPs, including for renewable fuels, is 
consistent with congressional and presidential interests.    
e. National Defense Authorization Act of 2010 
The NDAA of 2010 requires the DoD to produce or procure 25% or more 
of facility electricity from renewable energy no later than FY2025. 
Congress authorized and established funding required for meeting the 
president’s goals, but who is taking the lead in these endeavors? Although this is a DoD-
wide initiative, the Navy, under Secretary Ray Mabus, is leading the effort.  
C. DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 
In 2009 the SECNAV, Ray Mabus, outlined a five-step vision for the U.S. Navy 
adoption of biofuels and alternative energy technology. His vision is a direct response to 
presidential and congressional mandates, and recognition of the strategic and tactical 
limitations of traditional petroleum. In a 2009 speech to the Naval Energy Forum, 
Secretary Mabus (2009) said the following about our strategic dependence on petroleum: 
We know oil is a limited resource. We buy from volatile areas of the 
world. Over time, the price keeps going up. The use of oil creates harmful 
environmental effects. And to a certain extent we have ceded this to other 
nations who are allowed to exert disproportionate influence as a result. 
This creates an obvious vulnerability to our energy security, and to our 
national security, and to our future on this planet. (p. 2) 
In the same speech, Secretary Mabus (2009) also commented on the tactical 
implications of petroleum use. He said, 
Fossil fuel consumption has a deep impact upon our forces and our force 
structure, both in terms of the resources required to get fuel and to move it 
to the ships, tanks, aircraft, and equipment that need it, and in the Sailors 
and Marines whose duty it is to protect the ships or convoys moving the 
gas. We do not have operational independence and we are tied to a 
vulnerable logistics tail. (p. 2) 
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The DoN is the second largest user of petroleum within the DoD; the Air Force is 
the primary user. Figure 3 shows the percentage of DoD petroleum usage by Service.   
 
Figure 3.  DoD Petroleum Usage by Service, FY2011 (From Schwartz et al., 2012) 
DoN energy use differs from other the Services and the DoD. According to 
Schwartz et al. (2012), 
The Department of the Navy is less dependent on petroleum than the Air 
Force and the Army for meeting its energy needs, in part because all of the 
Navy’s aircraft carriers and submarines are nuclear-powered. In FY2010, 
the Department of the Navy met 59% of its overall energy needs from 
petroleum, 22% from nuclear-powered ships, and 19% from electricity. 
Aircraft operations account for 54% of the Navy’s use of petroleum fuels, 
ships account for 43%, and non-tactical uses account for 3%. 
Since FY2003, the DoN has reduced energy usage by 15.8%; most energy 
reduction occurred at the installation energy level (DoD, 2012, p. 19). 
1. Leading Energy Change 
In the same 2009 speech to the Naval Energy Forum, Secretary Mabus (2009) 




Leading change is not new for the Department of the Navy. We have done 
so repeatedly in the adoption of new technologies to power our ships. And 
resistance to change is not new either. In the middle of the nineteenth 
century the Navy traded wind for steam and the ability to maneuver in any 
direction at will. Naysayers swore at that point the Navy was giving up a 
sure means of propulsion in favor of uncertain, dangerous, and probably 
infernal machines. The naysayers were wrong.  
Forty years later, the liquid fuel board recommended that the Navy shift 
from coal to oil, which has twice as much thermal content and granted the 
ability to produce higher speeds in ships crewed by fewer sailors. Once 
again, traditionalists argued against adoption because the late-nineteenth 
century American Navy had already built a network of coaling stations 
around the world and established infrastructure built around coal. Again 
they were wrong. The Navy persevered. Oil created a tactical advantage; it 
allowed ships to stay at sea longer, replenish themselves underway from 
oilers rather than inport from coal bunkers, and oil reduced the need for 
ships to maintain huge divisions of stokers. (p. 4) 
Secretary Mabus (2009) clearly demonstrated his willingness to explore new 
renewable fuel technologies, including biofuel, despite resistance by members of 
Congress, industry, and the public. Establishing Navy renewable energy and biofuel is a 
primary concern of Secretary Mabus. To meet the presidential and congressional energy 
mandates, he established a five-step process. In his 2009 speech to the Naval Energy 
Forum he described the five steps:  
• Change the way the Navy and Marine Corps award energy contracts to 
include lifetime energy costs of a system as a mandatory evaluation factor. 
• Demonstrate by 2012 a Green Strike Group consisting of nuclear vessels 
and ships powered by biofuel. 
• By 2015, reduce the petroleum use in the Navy commercial vehicle fleet 
by replacing vehicles with flex fuel, hybrid, and electric vehicles. 
• By 2020, produce at least 50% of shore-based energy from alternative 
sources. 
• By 2020, 50% of energy consumption for ships, aircraft, tanks, and 
tactical vehicle should come from alternative energy. (Mabus, 2009) 
2. Alternative Operational Energy Progress 
Meeting alternative energy requirements for operational units has presented a 
unique challenge for the Navy. In order to use biofuel in Naval aircraft and ships, the 
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Navy requires biofuel to be a 50/50 blend with either jet propulsion fuel five (JP-5) for 
aircraft or diesel fuel marine (F-76 or DFM) for ships, to demonstrate no noticeable 
difference in performance, and to require no changes to the existing fuel delivery and 
storage infrastructure (Naval Air Systems Command [NAVAIR], 2012).  
a. Naval Aviation Biofuel 
Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) was the first naval organization 
to successfully test and demonstrate the viability of 50/50 biofuel mixes. Between 2010 
and 2012, the following aircraft types were successfully flown on biofuel:  
• F/A-18D Hornet 
• F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet 
• E/A-6B Prowler 
• MH-60S Seahawk 
• MV-22 Osprey 
• AV-8B Harrier 
• MQ-8B Fire Scout, and 
• T-45 Goshawk (NAVAIR, 2012). 
Further testing of biofuels in an operational environment occurred during 
the 2012 Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise. Throughout the RIMPAC, Carrier Air 
Wing Eleven operated on a 50/50 biofuel mix for the first time.   
b. The Great Green Fleet 
Meeting the SECNAV’s requirement to demonstrate the viability of 
biofuels in an operational environment occurred July 19 and 20, 2012. As part of the 
annual RIMPAC exercise, the Navy demonstrated the SECNAVs Great Green Fleet. The 
Greet Green fleet consisted of 
• USS Nimitz (CVN-68) and Carrier Air Wing Eleven, 
• USS Chaffee (DDG-90), 
• USS Chung Hoon (DDG-93), 
• USS Princeton (CG-59), and 
• USS Henry J. Kaiser (TAO 187; DoN, 2012). 
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In the demonstration, the USS Nimitz strike group burned 350,000 gallons 
of a 50/50 blended F-76 biofuel, while Carrier Air Wing Eleven burned 100,000 gallons 
of 50/50 blended JP-5 biofuel (DoN, 2012). The Henry J. Kaiser successfully 
demonstrated at-sea refueling by replenishing the strike group with both F-76 and JP-5 
biofuel blends. The RIMPAC successfully evaluated biofuels in an operational 
environment, proving the feasibility of biofuels for military applications. 
In this chapter, we discussed presidential interest and the strategic 
implications of biofuel for the United States. We explored U.S. law and congressional 
incentives for the development of commercial biofuels. Finally, we discussed the Navy’s 
early acceptance and adoption of biofuels, including the Navy’s biofuel adoption 
timeline. In the next chapter, we look at the history of biofuels, including the current 
production, cost, and output. Additionally, we discuss the difficulty the biofuel industry 
faces in moving from a viable production process to commercial viability before ending 
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. BIOFUELS 
Biofuel energy is one of many options for non–carbon-producing energy currently 
under exploration to replace fossil fuels (Patil, Tran, & Giselrød, 2008). Industry divides 
biofuels into two types: first generation and second generation. In this chapter, we discuss 
the differences between first- and second-generation biofuels, the state of the biofuel 
industry, challenges to the commercialization of biofuel, and the benefits of biofuel 
development. 
1. FIRST-GENERATION BIOFUELS 
First-generation biofuel sources include traditional food items such as potatoes, 
corn, sugar, and various vegetable and seed oils. Commonly known, these fuels include 
ethanol, biodiesel, and pure plant oil (Havlik et al., 2011). These fuels, mixed with fossil 
fuels such as gasoline and used in everyday engines or in flex fuel vehicles or natural gas 
vehicles, are available commercially in limited quantities through the normal 
infrastructure (Naik, Goud, Rout, & Dalai, 2010). There are two major issues associated 
with first-generation biofuels. The use of food staples in production leads to increases in 
worldwide food prices, and the production of first-generation biofuel have a myriad of 
potential negative environmental impacts.  
a. Rising Food Prices 
Using crops in alternative fuel production means less food is available for 
sale on the market, increasing the price of food (Naik et al., 2010). In the OECD-FAO 
Agricultural Outlook 2007–2016, the Organization for Economic Cooperation (2007), in 
conjunction with the United Nation’s Food and Agriculture Organization, cited first-
generation biofuels as a reason for long-term worldwide food price increases: 
Currently strong world market prices for many agricultural commodities 
in international trade are, in large measure, due to factors of a temporary 
nature, such as drought related supply shortfalls, and low stocks. But, 
structural changes such as increased feedstock, demand for biofuel 
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production, and the reduction of surpluses due to past policy reforms, may 
keep prices above historic equilibrium levels during the next 10 years. (p. 
10) 
The report continues, addressing the effects on developing countries, 
urban populations, and livestock farmers: 
Higher commodity prices are a particular concern for net food importing 
developing countries as well as the poor in urban populations, and will 
evoke on-going debate on the “food versus fuel” issue. Furthermore, while 
higher biofuel feedstock prices support incomes of producers of these 
products, they imply higher costs and lower incomes for producers that 
use the same feedstock in the form of animal feed. (Organization for 
Economic Cooperation, 2007, p. 10) 
b. Environmental Effects 
Environmental issues, specifically greenhouse gas emissions, are part of 
the push to develop first-generation biofuels. Ironically, this same development is leading 
to new ecological concerns. Changes in land use and concerns about rising greenhouse 
gases are the primary environmental issues arising from production of first-generation 
biofuel. 
Land is a scarce resource. As demand for food crop biofuels increases, 
farmers worldwide are clearing and cultivating forests and grasslands previously left 
untouched (Fargione, Hill, Tilman, Polsky, & Hawthorne, 2008). Clearing these lands 
releases carbon stored in the vegetation. The carbon removal capacity of this vegetation is 
lost, effectively increasing carbon emissions into the atmosphere (Searchinger et al., 
2008). Figure 4, from the article “Land Clearing and the Biofuel Carbon Debt” (Fargione 
et al., 2008), illustrates the time required to remove carbon emissions caused by this 




Figure 4.  Carbon Debt, Biofuel Carbon Debt Allocation, Annual Carbon Repayment 
Rate, and Years to Repay Biofuel Carbon Debt for Nine Scenarios of Biofuel 
Production (From Fargione et al., 2008) 
Carbon emissions are not the only greenhouse gasses released during the 
production of biofuels. The use of chemical fertilizers to grow first-generation biofuel 
feedstock generates nitrous oxide (N2O), which affects the ozone and has a global 
warming potential 296 times greater than that of carbon dioxide (CO2; Crutzen, Mosier, 
Smith, & Winiwarter, 2008). N2O released from fertilizer application during feedstock 
growth for biofuel production is three to five times greater than originally believed 
(Crutzen et al., 2008). Emissions of N2O offset reductions in greenhouse gases 
experienced when switching between petroleum and biofuel (Crutzen et al., 2008). 
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2. SECOND-GENERATION BIOFUELS 
Second-generation biofuels come from lignocellulosic feedstock, jatropha, and 
algae (Carriquiry, Du, & Timilsina, 2010). Second-generation biofuels do not compete 
for land because they are by-products or waste products. Those that do, such as jatropha 
and switch grass (a lignocellulosic feedstock), can be grown on marginal lands (Havlik et 
al., 2010).   
a. Lignocellulosic Feedstock 
Lignocellulosic feedstock comes from three sources: food crop by-
products, forestry by-products, and grass or wood energy crops. Sugars from these 
become bioethanol through fermentation and processing (Carriquiry et al., 2011). Food 
crop by-products come from various crops including corn, rice, and sugarcane. Forestry 
by-products originate from logging, fuel wood removal, and wood processing mills. 
Grass crops include switch grass and alfalfa, while wood energy crops come from fast-
growing trees such as poplar and eucalyptus (Carriquiry et al., 2010). 
b. Jatropha 
Jatropha is an oilseed-producing bush capable of growing in different 
climates and in good or poor soil. The bush is native to the Americas, but also grows in 
Asia and Africa (Carriquiry et al., 2011). Under the right conditions, jatropha produces 
large amounts of burnable oil with a high potential for use in biodiesel (Carriquiry et al., 
2011). 
c. Algae 
Algae, and specifically micro-algae, are not a new source of biofuel. The 
National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) experimented with algae from the late 
1970s to the mid-1990s (Carriquiry et al., 2011). Algae are extremely efficient in biofuel 
production. They thrive on various types of water and land, making them very versatile 
(Carriquiry et al., 2011). High per acre productivity makes this an attractive source. Table 
1 shows a comparison of fuel oil yields between two types of micro-algae and four 






Table 1.   Oil Yields of Algae and Other Seeds (From Carriquiry et al., 2011) 
Note. a Range from 10 g/m2/d at 30% Triacylglycerids (TAG) to 50 g/m2/d at 50% TAG. b Range from 
30% to 70% oil by weight in biomass.  
B. ALGAE-BASED BIOFUEL INDUSTRY 
The DoN’s use of 450,000 gallons of biofuels made from a combination of used 
cooking oils and algae as drop-in to create a 50/50 blend with petroleum signals the U.S. 
Navy’s continued commitment to meeting Secretary Mabus’ goal of deploying a Great 
Green Fleet in 2016 (NAVAIR, 2012). For this project, we focus on algae-based biofuel. 
Oil yields from algae, as shown in Table 1, are exponentially higher than yields from 
other second-generation feedstock. Higher oil yields from algae make it the preferred 
second-generation feedstock for the biofuel industry. 
1. History 
The idea to use algae as a fuel source originated at the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology (MIT) in the 1950s (Climate Institute, 2012). The oil embargo of the 1970s 
served as the catalyst for the first serious investigation into the viability of algae as a 
source of energy (Department of Energy [DoE], 2010). 
a. Aquatic Species Program (1978–1996) 
The DoE’s Aquatic Species Program is one of the most thorough 
investigations into the use of algae as a fuel source (DoE, 2010). The program ran from 
1978 to 1996. The program originally focused on using algae as a hydrogen source, but 
shifted to biodiesels in the early 1980s (Sheehan, Dunahay, Benemann, & Roessler, 
1998). Over this 18-year period, the United States invested about $25 million in the 
program (DoE, 2010). During this time, the program collected 3,000 types of microalgae. 









The samples came from throughout the United States and varying environments. 
Researchers then narrowed the collection to a tenth of its original size, identifying the 
300 algae types with oil production possibilities (DoE, 2010). The program also looked at 
various resources, including types of land, water, and power plants. It was determined 
that ample production resources existed to compete with petroleum use in the United 
States (DoE, 2010). The DoE shut down the Aquatic Species Program in 1995 due to 
funding cuts, but not before demonstrating that algae is a viable source of oil (DoE, 2010; 
Sheehan et al., 1998). 
b. Post-Aquatic Species Program (1996–Present) 
Government algal biofuel funding now originates in numerous 
governmental agencies. The DoD, Department of Agriculture (DoA), and DoE all 
provide funding for algal research (DoE, 2010). In 2002, the DoE started the biomass 
program with the aim to consolidate biofuel, bio-product, and bio-power research efforts 
(DoE, 2012). The DoE biomass program has four main goals: 
• reduce dependence on foreign oil; 
• promote the use of diverse, domestic, and sustainable energy resources; 
• establish a domestic bioenergy industry; and 
• reduce carbon emissions from energy production and consumption (DoE, 
2012). 
Additionally, the DoA and the DoE, in conjunction with the DoN, are working together 
to develop biofuels that can be used with petroleum after a challenge by President Obama 
to speed the process along (The White House, 2011). However, the government is not 
alone in this endeavor. Private companies are also pouring money into developing algal 
biofuels (DoE, 2010). Significant public and private investment lead one to ask the 
following question: With all of this money floating around, how developed is the algal 
biofuel industry base? 
2. Current Production and Pricing 
In the last section, we asked about the status of the algal biofuel industrial base. 
Figure 5 illustrates the stages of technology development. Currently, the advanced 
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biofuel industry is entering the latter half of the commercialization “valley of death,” 
Stage 4 (Solecki, Dougherty, & Epstein, 2012). 
 
Figure 5.  Stages of Technology Development (From Solecki et al., 2012) 
So what is the commercialization “valley of death”? For advanced biofuels, the 
Bloomberg New Energy Finance (BNEF, 2010) report Crossing the Valley of Death 
defined it as the following: 
In this phase, entrepreneurs face the dangerous convergence of high cash 
demands and a significant scarcity of capital. Without directly addressing 
this important market disconnect, clean energy deployment cannot move 
forward at the pace the climate challenge demands. (p. 5) 
a. Production 
The Advanced Biofuel Market Report for 2012 (Yudken, 2012) lists 74 
companies involved in producing high-end advanced biofuels; only seven list algae or 
algae oil as a feedstock. The 2012 combined capacity of these companies is 870 thousand 
gallons, or about 0.7% of the total of the 125.48 million gallons of high-end advanced 
biofuels. The report projects a total algae biofuel production of 186 million gallons by 
2015, a nearly 214-fold increase in three years. That total makes up approximately 10% 
of the total advanced biofuels production for 2015 (Solecki et al., 2012). 
b. Costs 
In 2010, a gallon of algae-based drop-in biofuel cost $455 per gallon 
(Universal Technology Corporation, 2010). In late 2011, the U.S. Navy paid $26 per 
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gallon of algae-based drop-in biofuels (Solecki et al., 2012). Although this is 17.5 times 
cheaper than the previous year, it is still nearly 9.5 times higher than the $2.75 per gallon 
cost for military-grade diesel (Andrews, Bracmort, Brown, & Else, 2012). What many 
fail to consider is the fact that the companies produced the drop-in biofuels for these 
cases in small quantities for testing purposes, not in the large quantities normally 
associated with petroleum use (Yudken, 2012). The basic cost structure for algal biofuels 
mimics the cost structure of traditional oil production. Algal biofuel production is 
dominated by high fixed costs and relatively low variable costs. Approximately two 
thirds of all costs associated with the production of algal biofuels are fixed costs (Davis, 
Aden, & Pienkos, 2011). 
Current demand for algae-based drop-in biofuels is difficult to find. In late 
2011, the U.S. Navy purchased 450,000 gallons of an algae and non-food-waste advanced 
biofuel for use in a Green Strike Group (Andrews et al., 2012). Current administration 
goals require 50% of the Navy’s fuel to be alternative fuels. Estimates place this at 
approximately 336 million gallons per year (DoD, 2011). Table 2 shows the projected 
DoD demand through 2020.  
 
 
Projected demand  2010  2011  2012  2013  2014  2015  2016  2017  2018  2019  2020  
Army  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  16.05  19.26  22.47  
Air Force  0.40  0.40  0.40  0.40  129.43  258.47  387.50  387.50  387.50  387.50  387.50  
Navy  0.19  0.32  0.45  0.45  0.56  1.12  1.68  84.00  168.00  252.00  336.00  
Total DoD  0.59  0.72  0.85  0.85  129.99  259.59  389.18  471.50  571.55  658.76  745.97  
Table 2.   DoD Total Tactical Renewable Fuel Demand by Year (Million Gallons) 
(DoD, 2011)   
3. Industry Challenges  
The algae biofuel industry faces many challenges as companies try to jump start a 
fledgling industry. Lack of funding at critical junctures and a need to lower costs to 
compete with traditional petroleum coupled with the discovery of new oil sources and the 
potential for the United States to become a net exporter of oil create a condition ripe for 




a. Valley of Death 
Investopedia (Valley, 2012) defines the valley of death as “a slang phrase 
used in venture capital to refer to the period of time from when a startup firm receives an 
initial capital contribution to when it begins generating revenues.” This phrase describes 
the difficulties, created by a lack of capital, facing a new technology traversing from the 
product development phase to the commercial phase. Progress from the research phase to 
the commercial phase for a new technology is difficult because it must cross the so-called 
commercialization valley of death, a phenomenon mainly caused by a lack of capital 
investment (BNEF, 2010).  
In March 2009, the Clean Energy Group (CEG) and Bloomberg New 
Energy Finance (BNEF) carried out a one-year study named Crossing the Valley of 
Death: Solutions to the Next Generation Clean Energy Project Financing Gap (BNEF, 
2010) with two purposes:  
• to survey and size the valley of death, and  
• to examine potential financial or policy mechanisms that might allow 
companies to successfully negotiate it (BNEF, 2010). 
This valley of death, situated between the pilot stage and the commercial 
stage, exists due to a lack of capital when the company or industry is experiencing a high 
demand for cash to purchase equipment, placing companies in an investment risk/reward 
category that is too risky for most banks and venture capitalists (BNEF, 2010). 
Accordingly, the only potential investor with not only the capital, but also 
the responsibility to finance this type of endeavor is a government. Moreover, 
government involvement in the development of new technology is not unprecedented. 
Nuclear power is one of many industries nurtured through its early stages by the 
government (BNEF, 2010). However, financing is not and should not be the only support 
the government provides to an industry as it peers into the valley of death. Laws and 
commercial backing that show the government leading the way in the use of new 
technology help create and increase demand (BNEF, 2010). 
The Advanced Biofuel Market Report (Solecki et al., 2012) discusses 
industry production and growth versus future demand for low carbon fuels, while 
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identifying stability as the primary hurdle to industry growth. Baseline stability can be 
established through government policy and funding programs. Government funding 
addresses the next barrier to industry growth, financing (Solecki et al., 2012). 
The first major U.S. policy for biofuel stability was the renewable fuel 
standard (RFS) initially established by the Energy Policy Act of 2005, which led to the 
opening of multiple biofuel refineries in recent years (Solecki et al., 2012). The successor 
to this policy, RFS2, requires that 36 billion gallons of renewable fuel be blended with 
gasoline by 2022. The policy also divides the renewable fuels into four categories, 
capping some that may have an effect on food prices. These caps effectively create a 
demand for advanced biofuels (such as algae biofuels), thus helping to expand the market 
for advanced biofuels and removing some of the entry barriers and risks for potential 
investors (Solecki et al., 2012). 
California’s low carbon fuel standard (LCFS) is another important policy 
initiative (Solecki et al., 2012). The LCFS requires a 10% reduction in carbon intensity of 
California’s transportation fuel by 2020. The program allows producers to determine the 
method they choose to meet the requirements, but also encourages producers to exceed 
the requirements by granting credits. Granting credits creates competition among 
producers, leading to industry advancement and expansion (Solecki et al., 2012). 
The RSF2, LCFS, and similar policies strengthen the industry by 
providing a steady environment. Steady policies encourage banks and companies to 
provide the necessary capital to increase production and capacity (Solecki et al., 2012). 
Encouragingly, some companies look to be successfully navigating the 
valley of death. Publicly traded Solazyme, a San Francisco-based company, recently 
secured $120 million in funding to build a joint-venture algae biofuel plant with the 
Brazilian agriculture company Bunge (Fehrenbacher, 2013). Construction began in 2012 
with initial production expected in the fourth quarter of 2013. Anticipated annual 
production levels start at 100,000 metric tons in 2014, with expected growth to 300,000 
metric tons per year (Fehrenbacher, 2013). Solazyme is also nearing commercial scale in 
the United States. Solazyme and Archer Daniels Midland (ADM), an Illinois-based 
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agriculture company, expect to produce 20,000 metric tons in 2014 at a factory in 
Clinton, Iowa, with a future production goal of 100,000 metric tons annually 
(Fehrenbacher, 2013).      
Two other companies expected to cross the valley of death are Sapphire 
Energy and Synthetic Genomics. Both companies use open-air ponds to grow algae 
(Fehrenbacher, 2013). Sapphire Energy’s Columbus, New Mexico, site consists of 70 
ponds and a refinery expected to produce 1.5 million gallons annually by 2014, with an 
expected daily production of 10,000 barrels by 2018 (Fehrenbacher, 2013). Synthetic 
Genomics, with $600 million in funding from Exxon, will begin testing synthetic algae 
strains at its 81-acre site in Imperial Valley in California (Fehrenbacher, 2013). 
b. Technological Barriers to Commercialization 
In 2008, the DoE sponsored a workshop to discuss and study the 
technological barriers to biofuel commercialization. The end product of this workshop 
was the National Algal Biofuels Technology Roadmap (NABTR), which categorized the 
two main technological challenges facing algae biofuel (DoE, 2010) as follows:   
• algae feedstock production and supply, and  
• algae feedstock processing and conversion. 
Building on the work of the NABTR, Gao, Gregor, Liang, Dawei and 
Tweed published a 2012 article titled “Algae Biofuel—A Feasibility Report” that 
confirmed the findings of the NABTR. Gao et al. (2012) also found that current 
production of algae biofuel is limited to small-scale production; therefore, the cost 
information associated with this level of production is not a reliable indicator of the true 
costs for commercial-scale production.  
(1) Algae Feedstock Production and Supply 
All algae have the potential to serve as biofuel feedstock; however, 
each type of algae has a unique set of requirements within the supply chain. The unique 
supply chain requirements of the algae types require significant investment in 
infrastructure and a commitment to a specific algae type (DoE, 2010). Among the algae 
species, Botryococcus braunii has shown the most promising results in small-scale 
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laboratory production; however, it has not been cultivated in large-scale production. 
Research into algae species and the associated oil production is not complete with many 
new algae species promising to deliver greater oil yields (Gao et al., 2012). With 
continued discovery and genetic enhancement of algae types, industry is reluctant to 
commit large amounts of capital to establish a unique and expensive supply chain for an 
algae type that may not be the best for use in commercial production (Gao et al., 2012). 
Until a standard algae type is found, investment in commercial algae production is 
expected to remain low. 
Selection of an algae type is only the first step in the production 
process. Cultivation of algae for biofuel requires nutrients, water treatment, and water 
recycling. At the laboratory level, the cultivation of algae is relatively inexpensive (DOE, 
2010); however, serious technical barriers exist when attempting to cultivate algae at a 
commercial scale. The costs associated with creating a dedicated algae cultivation system 
increase exponentially with capacity. Using the existing agriculture system to grow algae 
is possible and seems economically viable; however, algae are extremely sensitive to 
pathogens, chemical compounds, and heavy metals found in most commercial 
agriculture. Algae’s largest advantage as a biofuel feedstock is the ability to grow it on 
land not dedicated to food production. Using the existing agricultural system removes 
this advantage. The alternative to using the existing agricultural system is the 
development and use of artificial algae ponds. At this time, the large-scale creation, use, 
and maintenance of algae ponds requires further study (DoE, 2010).   
Two types of algae ponds exist, closed and open. In the closed-
pond system, algae are completely isolated from the outside environment through the use 
of growth tanks. All nutrients and waste are introduced and removed from the closed 
pond in a very controlled manner, minimizing the possibility of outside contamination. 
Closed systems slightly improve algae yield, but do so at a very high capital cost. The 
open-pond system is not isolated from the outside environment. Nutrients and waste are 
controlled, but the possibility of contamination from the environment is high. Although 
open-pond systems have a lower algae yield compared to closed-pond systems, they also 
have significantly lower capital cost. It is generally accepted that open-pond systems are 
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the preferred algae cultivation method (Gao et al., 2012). In the rest of this section, we 
focus on the technological challenges associated with open-pond systems.    
The NABTR identified two areas of cultivation that require 
technological improvement to facilitate the commercialization of algae biofuel: 
carbonation and mixing systems (DoE, 2010). Algae employ photosynthesis as their 
primary means of nutrient gathering. Photosynthesis is the process by which plants and 
algae absorb CO2, convert it to energy, and release oxygen (O2). In commercial-scale 
algae ponds, the immediately available CO2 is insufficient to sustain algae growth, 
creating a requirement for additional carbon sources. This carbon supply is the largest 
source of operating costs for an open-pond algae system. Short of an outright reduction in 
the cost of carbon, very little can be done to reduce carbon costs. Approximately 40% of 
the carbon introduced into an open algae pond converts to CO2 or dissolves in the water 
without providing nutrients for the algae (Gao et al., 2012). Research into carbon 
recycling includes capturing the carbon as it converts to CO2 and extracting the carbon 
that has dissolved in water. Although recycling techniques have proven viable, they are 
not cost effective. Continued development and cost reduction is required before carbon 
recycling is a cost-effective way to reduce the amount of carbon required for cultivation. 
Growing algae in an open pond requires mixing the pond to keep 
the algae’s nutrients from settling, and prevent thermal stratification. There are two 
mixing methods in use: paddle-wheel systems and airlift systems (Gao et al., 2012). 
Paddle-wheel systems use physical paddles to stir and mix open algae ponds. This type of 
mixing requires a large capital expenditure to ensure that the entire algae pond is mixed. 
Large physical paddles are prone to breakdown and deterioration in the algae ponds. 
Airlift mixing systems use air jets to mix the water of open ponds. Airlift mixing has 
significantly reduced mixing costs in small-scale laboratory ponds, but has not been 
successfully demonstrated at the commercial level. Although sufficient cost data are not 
available to determine airlift mixing costs at the commercial level, several experts agree 
the costs are likely to be high (Gao et al., 2012).  
(2) Algae Feedstock Processing and Conversion 
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Algae feedstock must go through processing and conversion before 
becoming a usable fuel. Processing of algae stock falls into two general steps: harvesting 
and extraction. The technology required to harvest and extract algae biomass depends on 
the exact type of algae being harvested and the location of the algae pond. Additionally, 
energy requirements increase exponentially as the amount of algae biomass being 
harvested increases (DoE, 2010).    
The small-scale laboratory methods used to harvest algae are the 
centrifuge or skimming method. These methods are suitable for small-scale algae 
production, but are extremely inefficient as the size of algae growth increases. Centrifuge 
use is not practical for large-scale commercial algae production because the capital costs 
are high and the throughput of the centrifuge is low. Skimming is a relatively inexpensive 
process in itself, but it only utilizes the top layer of algae growth on the surface of an 
open pond, resulting in approximately 60% of available algae being left in the pond (Gao 
et al., 2012). Other harvesting technologies, such as gas floatation, micro-strainers, belt 
filters, and settling ponds, have proven successful in small-scale production. These 
methods provide greater cost efficiency and show potential for commercial-scale 
harvesting, but they still require large-scale testing (Gao et al., 2012).  
Like all previous steps in algae biofuel production, the exact 
process of extracting oil from algae depends on the type of algae being used. The basic 
extraction process consists of two steps: drying and oil separation (DoE, 2010). Drying is 
a relatively straightforward process that is similar to many other commercial drying 
techniques used throughout various industries. The technological challenge comes during 
the actual oil separation step when the oil is separated from the dried algae biomass (Gao 
et al., 2012). The process of separating oil from biomass includes two steps: oil 
separation from biomass and trans esterification of oil. In commercial-scale algae 
production, oil is extracted from algae through physical grinding or sonically through a 
process called sonication. Both physical grinding and sonication agitate the algae 
biomass causing a breakdown of the organic structure of algae and release of the oil (Gao 
et al., 2012).   
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After the raw algae oil has been extracted, it must be converted 
into a usable form suitable for further refinement using traditional oil production 
techniques. This process is called transesterification and is the process by which algae oil 
is chemically converted into a usable form. Transesterification occurs in batch reactors 
that use large quantities of flammable organic solvents. After the transesterification 
process is complete the converted algae oil is separated from the organic solvents (Gao et 
al., 2012). In small-scale algae production, transesterification occurs through a manual 
process. Several designs for continuous-flow transesterification systems suitable for use 
at a commercial scale are in process; however, none have been tested, and the costs for 
operation are unknown (Gao et al., 2012). 
The main barriers to growth of the algae biofuel industry are high 
capital, operations, and maintenance costs (Riberio & Da Silva, 2012). Capital and fixed 
operating costs can be reduced with improved technology, experience, and economies of 
scale. The success of the algae biofuel industry depends on government intervention to 
encourage the required technological innovation (Ribeiro & Da Silva, 2012).  
c. Algae Biofuel’s Relationship With Traditional Petroleum 
In this section, we explore algae biofuel’s relationship with traditional 
fuels. Many barriers exist to the commercialization of biofuels in comparison to 
traditional petroleum. Oil prices, new sources of oil, and advancements in drilling and 
refining technology affect the pricing, demand, and investment potential of biofuels.  
The U.S. government first evaluated algae as a potential biofuel source 
during the 1970s’ oil crisis and continued to evaluate it through the 1990s. Unable to 
compete with traditional petroleum’s low price point, the algae biofuel program was 
abandoned by the DoE in 1996 (Yudken, 2012). In 2006, President Bush acknowledged 
America’s oil dependency, spurring investment in algae biofuel research. A 2010 study 
conducted by the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory concluded that the cost of 




Oil projections continue to discourage algae biofuel investment. Higher oil 
prices over the last decade increase the potential return on investment for most traditional 
oil projects, making more expensive oil extraction methods profitable. Higher oil prices, 
combined with increased oil exploration, increased global oil reserves by 8.3% in 2011. 
These oil reserves are enough to meet current demand for the next 54 years at existing 
production levels (Bergin, 2012). Table 3 illustrates the world-proven oil reserves by 
region in 2011 (BP, 2012). 
Area Proven Oil Reserves (millions of barrels) 
North America 217,487 
South and Central America 325,367 
Europe and Eurasia 141,071 
Middle East 794,980 
Africa 132,438 
Asia Pacific 41,269 
Total Proven Oil Reserves 1,652,612 
Table 3.   Distribution of World-Proven Oil Reserves by Region in 2011 (From BP, 
2012)  
World oil consumption is rising, reaching 88 million barrels per day (BP, 
2012). Consumption in Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) countries dropped by 600,000 barrels per day, and non-OECD countries, led by 
China, experienced a surge in use of 1.2 million barrels per day (BP, 2012). Figure 6 
illustrates the world oil production and consumption by region (BP, 2012). 
In 2011, annual world oil production increased by 1.1 million barrels per 
day. The Organization of Petroleum-Exporting Countries (OPEC) has the highest net 
growth in world oil production, with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and 
Qatar leading production growth (BP, 2012). Outside of OPEC, the United States, 
Canada, Russia, and Colombia showed increased production levels. With an increase of 
285,000 barrels per day in 2011, U.S. production reached its highest levels since 1998, 
leading all non-OPEC countries for the previous three years (BP, 2012). New 




Figure 6.  World Oil Production and Consumption by Region (From BP, 2012) 
A major breakthrough in drilling techniques, known as fracking, is the 
primary driver behind the surge in U.S. production (Fahey, 2012). Continued U.S. 
production depends on the cost of drilling. Fracking is much more expensive than the 
types of drilling used in places such as Saudi Arabia. Although $75 per barrel seems to be 
the cutoff for U.S. drillers, International Energy Agency projections place the lowest 
prices at $89 per barrel over the next five years, certainly no threat to U.S. production 
(Fahey, 2012). 
Production of U.S. crude oil and other liquid hydrocarbons, including 
biofuels, rose by 7% in 2012 to about 10.9 million barrels per day, marking a fourth 
straight year of rising production. 2012 also marked the highest annual increase since 
1951 (Fahey, 2012). For 2013, the DoE projects U.S. production to reach 11.4 million 
barrels per day, near the daily production levels of Saudi Arabia. Predictions also place 
U.S. production levels at 13 to 15 million barrels per day by 2020, leading some to dub 
the United States the next “Middle East” (Fahey, 2012).  
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Where does this leave algae biofuel? Biochemist Dr. John Benemann 
answered by stating, “Algae biofuels cannot compete with fossil energy based on simple 
economics.…The real issue is that an oil field will deplete eventually, while an algae 
pond would be sustainable indefinitely” (Gable, 2012, p. 1). 
4.  Why Government Intervention?  
In Chapter II, we discussed the strategic importance of biofuels from the view of 
the U.S. government. Both the executive and legislative branches of our government 
believe developing and producing commercially viable biofuels in the United States gives 
the United States a strategic advantage. This advantage stems directly from the reduced 
importance of foreign oil, which gives the United States greater room to maneuver 
politically, militarily, and economically.   
a. Political Impacts of Oil Dependency 
A recent Council on Foreign Relations (CFR, 2006) report identified five 
ways that foreign oil dependency alters U.S. and worldwide foreign policy.   
Oil-exporting countries have the flexibility and funding to adopt policies 
that oppose U.S. and worldwide interests. This flexibility is seen in the actions of 
countries such as Iran, Russia, and Venezuela. Iran funds much of its nuclear ambitions 
through the sale of petroleum despite economic sanctions imposed by the United Nations. 
Capital from petroleum sales raises the standard of living in Russia even while Moscow 
tightens control over the populace. Venezuela’s increasing influence and displacement of 
the United States in Latin America is driven by the monies from petroleum sales (CFR, 
2006). 
Countries such as China constrain the United States’ ability to form 
partnerships to achieve common objectives. Recent examples of political realignment 
include China’s shift in attitude toward the Middle East, Asia, and Africa. Despite 
different political and national interests, China has opened the door to cooperation with 
countries openly hostile to the United States in order to secure oil supplies. China’s move 
to secure oil in Asia directly challenges U.S. influence in countries such as Kazakhstan. 
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China’s involvement with oil production in Sudan has resulted in the inability of the UN 
to manage the Darfur crisis. China continually threatens to use its veto power on the UN 
Security Council whenever the UN proposes action in Darfur (CFR, 2006). 
High oil prices require importing countries to include political 
arrangements to guarantee oil supplies, circumventing the open-market system and 
guaranteeing oil sales to the country offering the most political benefits. These political 
deals often include infrastructure projects not related to oil production or exportation. 
Recent examples of Chinese oil investments in Africa have included deals to construct 
airports and telecommunication systems. These types of arrangements pose problems for 
the United States because they lead to political relationships that are difficult for the 
United States to reproduce and because they foster the idea that oil importers obtain 
access to oil through political favor versus a properly functioning global market (CFR, 
2006). 
Oil and gas revenue often undermines local governance, particularly in 
countries with less robust governments. Poorly governed and politically unstable counties 
struggle to properly manage the large revenue generated by national oil sales. National oil 
sales also entrench existing governments, even when they are opposed by the populace. 
Attempts by the United States to establish oil trade relationships with unpopular 
governments are perceived as tacit support for the totalitarian regime. Within the United 
States, popular opinion of the government suffers when it is forced to deal with 
unpopular regions such as the Middle East and Africa to secure adequate oil supplies 
(CFR, 2006). 
During periods of oil price volatility or interruption, the United States and 
other oil-importing countries’ foreign policy is adversely impacted. When disruptions to 
the U.S. oil supply occur, most ongoing foreign policy is put on hold while the country 
scrambles to normalize the oil supply. Often, foreign policy measures reached in order to 
stabilize oil supplies and prices run counter to planned U.S. foreign policy and may be 
counterproductive for long-term U.S. strategy (CFR, 2006).  
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Although the CFR report (2006) does not go so far as to say that biofuels 
are the answer to foreign oil dependency, it does recommend government involvement in 
alternative fuel research in an effort to reduce the political impacts of oil dependency. 
b. Military Benefits of Biofuel 
Biofuel commercialization benefits the U.S. military in a number of ways; 
however, all the benefits generally fall into two categories: shortening of supply lines and 
reduction in price volatility.   
(1) Price Volatility 
Economist Teresa Serra (2012) of the Center for Agricultural 
Economics in Spain defined price volatility as “generally characterized as a directionless 
variation in prices that cannot be predicted by market fundamentals, or, more intuitively, 
it is a measure of the extent to which prices jitter” (p. 2).  
Serra (2012) described the ability of the U.S. biofuel industry to 
influence crude oil prices:   
There are only a few studies that are able to provide a response to the issue 
of long-run causality links flowing from biofuel to crude oil price levels. 
Neither the Brazilian, nor the U.S. biofuels industries are found able of 
shaping crude oil prices. (Serra, 2012 p. 7)   
In its current form the U.S, biofuel industry does not have the 
production volume required to influence and stabilize crude oil prices. President Obama 
seeks to stabilize fuel prices for the American consumer through the development of 
alternative fuels and energy technologies. In his Blueprint for a Secure Energy Future 
(The White House, 2011), he stated, “Volatile gasoline prices reinforce the need for 
innovation that will make it easier and more affordable for consumers” (p. 4). 
The president’s statement demonstrated the link between energy 
security and the idea of petroleum price stabilization. Although President Obama speaks 
of stabilizing petroleum prices for the consumer, stabilizing petroleum prices also 
benefits the military. Understanding the impact of high prices on defense budgets 
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requires understanding the basic process by which the DoD receives and allocates 
funding. 
Congress provides the DoD with funding each year through a 
series of appropriations bills. These bills grant the DoD budget authority to spend money 
in five basic categories: research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E); 
procurement; military construction (MILCON); military personnel (MILPERS); and 
Operations and Maintenance (O&M; Jones, Candreva, DeVore, 2011). RDT&E, 
procurement, and MILCON are commonly referred to as investment accounts, while 
MILPERS and O&M are referred to as operations accounts. The investment accounts 
fund the development, procurement, and construction of future weapons systems and 
support infrastructure. These accounts buy future military capability. Operations accounts 
fund the day-to-day operation of the DoD, providing pay for military and civilian 
personal and funds to purchase spare parts, fuel, and operating necessities. Operations 
accounts can be thought of as mandatory spending accounts, while investment accounts 
may be thought of as discretionary spending accounts.  
In “The Impact of Cash Flow Volatility on Discretionary 
Investment and the Cost of Debt and Equity Financing,” Bernadette Minton and 
Catherine Scrhand (1999) said, 
Higher cash flow volatility implies that a firm is more likely to have 
periods of internal cash flow shortfalls. Our analysis indicates that firms 
do not simply react to these shortfalls by changing the timing of 
discretionary investments to match cash flow shortfalls. Rather, firms 
forgo investments. Cash flow volatility is not the only reason that 
volatility affects investment decisions. Cash flow volatility is also 
positively related to a firm’s cost of accessing external capital. Firms with 
higher cash flow volatility will have higher capital costs. (p. 31)  
The DoD acts in the same manner as business. When fuel prices, or 
other budgetary pressures, squeeze the O&M budget, the DoD initially seeks release from 
Congress through the form of additional appropriations; consider this as the corollary to a 
firm seeking external capital. The DoD faces a much higher price or capital cost when 
requesting this additional funding. This price is not in the form of higher interest rates, 
but rather congressional and public scrutiny of defense budgets and the requirement to 
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justify why the originally submitted budget is no longer adequate. If Congress does not 
grant additional budget authority, then the DoD looks inward to find savings to offset 
increased and volatile fuel costs. Figure 7 shows how the U.S. Navy plans to change its 
budget based on a reduction of $58.1 billion between FY2012 and FY2013.   
  
Figure 7.  U.S. Navy Appropriation Changes From FY2012 to FY2013 President’s 
Budget (From E. Cochrane, Associate Director Assistant Secretary of the 
Navy for Financial Management and Comptroller, personal communication, 
February 7, 2013) 
Figure 7 shows a 55% reduction in procurement spending to meet 
the FY2013 budget. This reduction in procurement spending is analogous to a company 
deciding not to make capital investments. Firms that reduce R&D and capital 
procurement spending during periods of price volatility often face the difficult and costly 
task of doubling or tripling investment spending in the future when attempting to catch up 
on missed spending opportunities (Minton & Schrand, 1999). The DoD faces a similar 
“catch-up” spending problem when price volatility pushes out investment spending. 
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The desire to stabilize prices in the domestic and military fuels 
market could be assisted through the increased production of biofuels if the production 
quantity is sufficient to influence crude oil prices (Serra, 2012). 
(2) Lines of Communication 
Noted nineteenth-century military philosopher Carl Von 
Clausewitz (1832/1989) defined lines of communication, in his book On War as follows: 
Routes that lead from an Army’s position back to the main sources of 
supplies and replacements, and that are apt to be the ones the Army 
chooses in the event of a retreat, have two purposes. In the first instance 
they are the lines of communication serving to maintain the Army and in 
the second they are the lines of retreat.   
They link the Army to its base, and must be considered its arteries. The 
roads are in constant use for all sorts of deliveries, for ammunition 
convoys, detachments moving back and forth, mail carriers and couriers, 
hospitals and depots, reserve munitions, and administrative personnel. All 
this together is vital to the Army 
These arteries, then, must not be permanently cut, nor must they be too 
long or difficult to use. A long road always means a certain waste of 
strength, which tends to cripple the condition of the Army. (p. 364)  
Clausewitz (1832/1989) identified lines of communication as vital 
links that connect front-line units to a support infrastructure providing needed supplies. 
These links are vital to the operation of front-line units and cutting them can be disastrous 
to a nation’s military and to the nation itself. To understand the military benefits gained 
by reducing supply lines through the development of domestic biofuels, one must look at 
the sea lines of communication (SLOCs). Twentieth-century military philosopher Julian 
Corbett (1911) applied the concept of lines of communication to the world’s oceans. In 
his book, Some Principals of Naval Strategy, he defined SLOCs as follows: 
Sea lines of communication. This expression is used of three different 
things: (1) Lines of supply, running from the base of operations to the 
point which the operating force has reached.  (2) Lines of lateral 
communication by which several forces engaged in one theatre of 
operations can communicate with each other and move to each other’s 
support. (3) Lines of retreat, which are lines of supply reversed, i.e., 
leading back to the base.  
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Ashore lines of passage and communication are roads, railways, and 
waterways. At sea, they may be regarded as those waters over which 
passes the normal course of vessels proceeding from the base to the 
objective or the force to be supplied. They may also be regarded as trade 
routes, that is communications upon which depend the national resources 
and the supply of the main bases, as well as the “lateral” or connecting 
communications between various parts of a country’s possessions. (p. 176) 
We continue to see the importance of trade routes today, as seen in 
the SLOCs of the Middle East depicted in Figure 8. Figure 8 shows the strategic passages 
and shipping lanes for the Middle East and provides an idea of the amount of 
conventional petroleum moved between the three choke points in the region. 
 
Figure 8.  Shipping Lanes and Strategic Passages of the Middle East (From Rodrigue, 
2004) 
Although only 16% of the petroleum used by the United States 
moves through these shipping lanes, the majority of imported oil transits the seas (EIA, 
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2011). The Middle East SLOCs shown in Figure 8 represent the choke-point 
vulnerabilities found throughout the earth’s oceans. These strategic choke points are 
vulnerabilities in the U.S. supply of imported oil and, thus, vulnerabilities for the U.S. 
military, which is heavily dependent on oil. The development of domestic biofuel can 
help reduce the dependency on foreign oil transported across vulnerable SLOCs by 
shortening the lines of communication. Instead of shipping crude oil to the United States 
for refining and returning refined oil to forward operating bases, domestic biofuel 
production could offset or eliminate the initial importation.  
c. Economic Benefits 
As an industry grows, new infrastructure is required to increase 
productivity to meet the increasing demand. Infrastructure growth can be observed in the 
expansion of the biofuel industry. Between now and 2020, 27 new algae biofuel plants 
are planned. These plants create direct and indirect economic benefits for the United 
States. 
Direct economic benefits are defined as economic outputs generated by the DoD’s 
purchase of drop-in biofuel to meet the 2020 fuel targets (Yudken, 2012). Algae biofuel 
refineries are expected to directly produce between $9.6 billion and $19.8 billion in 
economic activity from 2013 through 2020, and $1.2 billion to $2.4 billion in economic 
activity ever year after 2020 (Yudken, 2012). These direct economic benefits include the 
feedstock purchases, conversion of feedstock to biofuel, sales and distribution, and 
facility construction. Direct job creation estimates fall between a low of 96,600 and a 
high of 132,100 (Yudken, 2012).   
Indirect economic benefits are defined as the change in economic activity 
resulting from subsequent rounds of production inputs purchased by industries affected 
by the planned DoD biofuel purchases along with changes in spending by workers whose 
earnings are affected by DoD biofuel purchases (Yudken, 2012). Indirect economic 
benefits are expected to add between $19.2 billion and $43.3 billion in economic activity 
between 2013 and 2020 with $2.4 billion to $5.4 billion in economic activity each year 
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after 2020. Indirect job creation estimates fall between a low of 160,500 and a high of 
215,400.   
In this chapter, we explored first- and second-generation biofuels, including the 
benefits of each type of feedstock. We examined the algae biofuel industry, discussing 
current production, costs, output, and the reasons algae biofuel is the preferred feedstock. 
Next we discussed the commercialization problem or why algae biofuel has not 
successfully crossed the valley of death. Finally, we discussed the reasons for 
government intervention into the biofuel market, including the benefits for the 






One of the most important questions researchers must ask themselves before 
starting a research project is, “Will I use qualitative or quantitative analysis to answer my 
research question?”  In this chapter, we describe why we used a qualitative approach to 
answer our research question and document the research methods used.  
A. QUANTITATIVE VS. QUALITATIVE APPROACH 
Originally, we planned to use a quantitative research approach to understand the 
government’s influence on commercialization of biofuels. Our initial research found 
limited data to support a quantitative approach to explain when biofuels could be 
commercialized. We looked into alternatives to quantitative research and were led to 
authors Miles and Huberman (1994). In their book Qualitative Data Analysis: An 
Expanded Sourcebook, Miles and Huberman (1994) described four considerations 
researchers should evaluate to determine whether qualitative research is appropriate. 
Those considerations are as follows:  
• local grounding, 
• richness and holism, 
• sustained period and causality, and 
• lived meanings (Miles & Huberman, 1994). 
Local grounding refers to the study of specific organizations, participants, and 
processes because they hold intrinsic interest or because the organizational process can be 
understood only when the context is included in analysis. Technology systems, in 
particular those with national interest, are often subject to greater social and political 
influence (Patel & Pavitt, 1994). Thus, the complex nature of the biofuel industry cannot 
be studied without understanding the industry, including major players and the political 
and economic environments.   
Richness and holism is the requirement for substantial depth in qualitative 
research. It is like asking the question, “Are you interested in more than numbers?”  
Initially, our plan for analyzing biofuel commercial viability appeared as a purely 
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economic question. However, as we discussed in Chapter III, biofuels are not 
commercially viable. In economic terms, the market alone will not create a biofuels 
industry; hence, our research becomes a question of strategic priorities and subjective 
assessments of value. A heated debate rages within the United States regarding the 
economic benefits of developing a technology with no clear economic future.    
Understanding why the United States continues to push for biofuel development requires 
understanding more than just economic numbers. It requires a holistic approach not 
available when using quantitative research methods.  
Sustained period and causality is a method of observing an organization or 
process over a large period of time in order to develop casual inferences. Understanding 
the Navy’s influence on biofuel commercialization requires long periods of observation 
and comparison to earlier commercialization attempts in industry. The relatively short-
term quantitative information available on the cost, price, and economic willingness to 
pay for biofuels is insufficient to conduct a quantitative analysis. Organizations studying 
biofuels readily agree that several more years of cost and pricing data are required before 
accurate predictions about the biofuel industry are feasible. We do not have the time to 
observe personally the development of the biofuel industry and document the actions that 
successfully led to commercialization. By using a qualitative analysis, we compare 
purposively selected similar cases that do have a sufficient timespan and conduct a 
longitudinal analysis. 
Lived meanings describes the perspectives of people and organizations and 
organizational structure. Lived meanings asks the question, “Are people’s viewpoints, 
perceptions, assumptions, and organization structure important in understanding decision-
making?”  Taking a purely quantitative approach to biofuels excludes a large amount of 
data, namely the perspectives of the people and organizations making the investments. 
These perspectives are important in truly understanding the biofuel industry and how 
commercialization occurs.  
Comparing our research to Miles and Huberman’s (1994) four considerations, we 
determined that qualitative research is the best method to fully explore biofuels, 
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specifically biofuel commercialization. Deciding on a qualitative approach presented a 
new dilemma. What type of qualitative research best suits our research question? 
B. GROUNDED THEORY 
Grounded theory is a qualitative method originally proposed by Glaser and 
Strauss in 1967, and it was adopted widely across the social sciences. In their book titled 
The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research, Glaser and 
Strauss (1967) defined a grounded approach as “the discovery of theory from data 
systematically obtained through social research.” 
Glaser and Strauss (1967) stated that a grounded theory is the ideal methodology 
for uncovering basic social processes and is useful for understanding the underlying 
processes of a complex situation. Thomas Lee (1998) expanded grounded theory in his 
book, Using Qualitative Methods in Organizational Research. He said, 
The main purpose of grounded theory studies is to generate new theory or 
conceptual propositions, and the main application of grounded theory 
techniques has been to the examination of phenomena that are not well 
understood. An underlying assumption in grounded theory is that social 
phenomena are complex. Correspondingly, the specific steps taken to 
study these complex social phenomena need to be flexible. Thus, there can 
be no hard-and-fast rules about how to conduct grounded theory research. 
(p. 36) 
 We adopted a grounded approach to case analysis. That is, we did not conduct a 
grounded theory analysis and our aim was not to develop a new theory. Rather following 
recent developments in grounded theory methods (Corbin & Strauss, 2008), we applied a 
grounded theory approach to case analysis in order to explore a practical problem. As 
suggested by Glaser and Strauss (1967), we allowed our initial examination of the data to 
drive our subsequent analysis. We did not engage in line-by-line coding to generate 
theoretical concepts, but rather conducted a thematic analysis.  
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C. THE CASE STUDY APPROACH 
In the article “Building Theories from Case Study Research,” Kathleen M. 
Eisenhardt (1989) developed a process for generating theory or propositions from case 
studies. Her process includes six steps with associated activities: 
• define research questions, 
• select cases and sources, 
• craft instruments and protocols, 
• analyze data, 
• shape hypotheses, and 
• compare literature.  
In the remainder of this chapter, we discuss how we applied Eisenhardt’s (1989) 
six steps to our research.  
1. Define Research Questions 
Eisenhardt explained the purpose of defining a research question as, “The 
rationale for defining the research question is the same as it is in hypotheses testing 
research. Without a research focus, it is easy to become overwhelmed by the volume of 
data” (p. 3). 
In Chapter III, we discussed the barriers facing commercialization of biofuels. We 
identified these barriers as cheap traditional petroleum and expensive biofuel production 
technology. Our initial research question asked, “Can the federal government influence 
commercialization of biofuel technology?”  Intuitively, we suspected the answer was yes. 
The government can influence commercialization of technology, through myriad means 
such as direct or partnered research, purchasing of products, and grants. Since we know 
that an organization can influence technology, the more appropriate research question 
becomes, “Are the government biofuel initiatives likely to result in commercial 
viability?”  Because of the complexity and early stage of biofuel development, to answer 
this question we explore how the government has influenced technological systems 
commercialization in the past and how the government is influencing biofuels today.   
 
47 
2. Select Cases and Sources 
In any research, appropriate data selection is critical for success. Selection of 
appropriate and relevant data allows the researcher to generalize findings and indicate the 
range of result applicability (Eisenhardt, 1989). In quantitative research, most sampling 
of cases or data is done by random selection to ensure accurate and relevant statistical 
analysis. Emphasis is placed on ensuring the sample data are not biased or focused on a 
single area of a population. In qualitative research, sampling of cases or collection of data 
need not be random (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Qualitative cases should be chosen to 
provide a basis for comparison, extend theory, fill theoretical categories, or provide 
examples of opposing viewpoints (Eisenhardt, 1989).   
Case selection is usually a combination of purposeful selection and planned 
opportunism (Pettigrew, 1997). We selected cases containing information and data 
regarding successful technological commercialization endeavors involving the federal 
government that supported the U.S. Navy. Two of the best cases are nuclear power and 
nanotechnology. We defined best as cases containing successful commercialization with 
sufficient scope of available literature. These cases allow us to understand the structure 
and process that results in successful technological commercialization, and answer our 
first two research questions. We used a third case study, the ongoing biofuel case, to 
answer our final question. Ideally, we would select a failed case; however, due to the 
limited time available for our research, we did not analyze a failed case. We recognize 
this as a limitation to our research. 
Source selection began with a simple Google Scholar search. We 
conducted searches for all sources using keywords appropriate to each case. The searches 
used these keywords: nuclear, power, commercialization, Navy, nanotechnology, and 
biofuels. This initial search led us to our first sources. After finding our first sources, we 
applied the snowball sampling method. Using snowball sampling, our first references led 
us to new sources. We gathered new sources until we reached data saturation. 
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3. Crafting Instruments and Protocols 
When building a proposition, multiple data collection methods are usually 
employed. In qualitative data collection, the typical methods are interviews, observations, 
and archival sources. Although it is acceptable to use only one data collection method 
(Eisenhardt, 1989), we recognize that multiple data collection methods substantiate 
developed propositions. Due to limited research time, interviews and direct observations 
were not possible. Our research was limited to the use of archival sources describing the 
development of the nuclear power and nanotechnology programs. We recognize this as a 
limitation of our study. 
Eisenhardt (1989) presented the idea of multiple investigators as a way to build 
confidence in findings and increase the likelihood of surprise findings. We used a 
variation of this technique. Project members divided the responsibilities for data review 
and analysis by case, with each team member analyzing a single case. The group then 
reviewed each case, allowing the group members who did not analyze the case to 
critically review the details, factors, and assumptions of the case. Group review generates 
discussion and brings varying, and possibly more objective, views to light (Eisenhardt, 
1989). 
4. Analyze Data 
In qualitative research following a grounded approach, data analysis begins 
during the collection process. Combining data analysis and collection provides the 
flexibility to alter data collection methods in order to respond to the existing data and 
develop concepts and propositions. It also allows the researcher to begin sifting out and 
categorizing important data, but, more importantly, it allows researchers to structure the 
large volumes of data (Eisenhardt, 1989). We began our case study analysis drawing on 
the PESTEL framework. The PESTEL framework contains six factors that we believed 
had potential to influence the macro environment. Factors in the PESTEL model were 
dropped and added as necessary based on the findings of case reviews. Figure 9 shows 
the original PESTEL model and includes the standard factors that may influence 
innovation of technological systems.   
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Figure 9.  PESTEL Model, Describing Factors That May Influence Innovation of 
Technological Systems 
The PESTEL framework was applied independently to each archival source for 
the three cases studies. Determining where case data fit within the framework was 
dependent upon the team member conducting the research. Assigning responsibility for 
one complete case to a single researcher helped maintain consistency throughout the 
categorizing process. Data analysis for each case was considered complete when new 
archival sources failed to introduce new information, or in other words we achieved data 
saturation (Eisenhardt, 1989). Upon completion, each source had a complete PESTEL 
analysis. When each PESTEL analysis was combined, it created a master case analysis.   
A key part of data analysis is searching for patterns across cases. In our research, 
cross-case analysis involved three steps:   
• comparison of nuclear power to nanotechnology,  
• proposition development from nuclear power and nanotechnology, and 
• application of propositions to biofuels. 
There is a potential for bias when conducting cross-case analysis. People are poor 
processors of information and can reach premature and false conclusions as a result of 
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information-processing bias (Eisenhardt, 1989). In order to address information-
processing bias, we employed two tactics. The first tactic to prevent information bias was 
information categorization using the PESTEL framework. This framework provides 
categories for comparison of data across numerous sources and cases. The use of 
categories assisted in drawing inferences between multiple sources and cases by 
standardizing the data collection and display. The second tactic to prevent information 
bias was comparison of similarities and differences between cases (Eisenhardt, 1989). In 
our research, we compared the successful commercialization of nuclear power against the 
successful commercialization of nanotechnology in order to define successful 
commercialization. We acknowledged similarities between the two cases as they 
provided reasons for common success. We also acknowledged differences between cases, 
allowing us to acknowledge the uniqueness of each case. The differences between cases 
also provided a way to demonstrate different solutions used to solve a common problem.  
5. Shaping Hypothesis 
Hypothesis generation in qualitative research does not follow traditional scientific 
theory. Hypotheses are often not generated before research is conducted in qualitative 
research. Instead the hypothesis often begins to present itself during the analysis process 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). In our research, we developed our proposition during our case 
analyses of nuclear power and nanotechnology. Each researcher began to see patterns 
emerge and began to infer relationships between the PESTEL factors and the outcome 
discussed in the source. Separate propositions were generated for the nuclear power and 
nanotechnology cases before the cross-case comparison was conducted. These 
independent propositions described successful commercialization for each case and were 
constantly updated as new sources were found and analyzed. When cross-case 
comparison was conducted, the two independent propositions were compared to develop 
a master proposition describing successful commercialization. The master hypothesis was 
tested against the nuclear power and nanotechnology cases to ensure proper fit.   
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6. Compare Literature 
We compared the PESTEL factors of the master proposition to existing literature 
and looked for conflicting or complementing literature. Examining conflicting literature 
is important for two reasons. First, ignoring conflicting literature reduces the validity and 
confidence in our findings. By acknowledging conflicting literature, we prevented other 
readers from assuming our results are incorrect, or if correct, the results are recognized as 
specific to a given case (Eisenhardt, 1989). Second, acknowledging conflicting literature 
forced us to achieve deeper insight into our studies. We became familiar not only with 
our research, but also with the research of others whose results conflict with ours. 
Studying conflicting research resulted in deeper understanding of our cases and generated 
more creative thinking that refined our findings (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Understanding similar findings from other researchers is also important. Again we 
were forced to become familiar with others’ research. The similarities between others’ 
results and ours brought together processes and phenomena that initially appeared 
unrelated (Eisenhardt, 1989). Acknowledging similar research further refined and 
strengthened our proposition, adding validity and generalizability.   
We used the idea of triangulation proposed by Todd Jick (1979) in his article 
“Mixing Qualitative and Quantitative Methods: Triangulation in Action.”  Jick defined 
triangulation as the combination of methodologies in the study of the same phenomenon 
in order to ensure that results represented the underlying structure and process of an issue 
and not the traits of the methodology used in analysis. The idea behind triangulation is 
that multiple independent measures of data collection provide a more certain portrayal of 
the issue being studied, if they reach the same conclusion (Jick, 1979). 
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In this chapter, we draw on the PESTEL framework to identify and compare the 
factors that contributed to the development of nanotechnology and the nuclear industry. 
We highlight similarities and draw general conclusions about successful 
commercialization of technology systems. We identify and discuss conflicting literature 
and conclude the chapter with a comparison of our generalized findings to the biofuel 
case.   
A. NUCLEAR POWER AND NANOTECHNOLOGY  
We examined the early development of the nuclear power and nanotechnology 
industries independently drawing on the PESTEL framework. First, we identified the key 
element within each industry for each PESTEL factor. The key elements are displayed in 
Table 4. Next, we compared the PESTEL factors across the two cases to identify key 
drivers for each factor, shown in Table 5 at the end of this chapter. These generalized 
findings are the basis for our subsequent analysis and comparison with the biofuel case.   
Factor Nuclear Power Nanotechnology 




Economic Power Reactor 
Demonstration Program 
Government Funding 
Environmental/Social Social Concerns with 
Pollution 
Social Health and 
Environmental Concerns 




Legal Atomic Energy Act of 1954  Nanotechnology Patent 
Protection 
Table 4.   PESTEL Factors for Success in Commercialization of Nuclear Power and 
Nanotechnology 
1. Political Factors 
As discussed in this section, we determined that government involvement 
and coordination were key political factors affecting nuclear power and nanotechnology 
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development. These government programs assisted and guided R&D to serve national 
interests, and provided a catalyst for commercialization. 
a. Political Factors and Nuclear Power 
The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 created the Atomic Energy Council 
(AEC) and shifted responsibility for the development of U.S. atomic energy from the 
Army and the Manhattan District (Allen, 1977). The establishment of the AEC laid the 
groundwork for a national government initiative to develop and use atomic energy for 
“improving the public welfare, increasing the standard of living, strengthening free 
enterprise, and promoting world peace” (Allen, 1977). 
Congress assigned the AEC five tasks intended to include the private 
sector in nuclear research and development. Those tasks were the following:  
• support research and development in the private sector to achieve 
the highest amount of technical growth possible;  
• distribute information related to atomic research in a controlled 
fashion, and control the manufacture and usage of uranium and 
plutonium; 
• provide laboratories to research atomic energy whether or not there 
was any economic gain; and 
• provide for the administration of the entire program while allowing 
dialogue with other nations concerning nuclear energy (Allen, 
1977).  
What effects, either positive or negative, did these tasks have on the early 
development of nuclear power? Congress intended the AEC tasks to encourage 
commercial industry participation in the development of the nuclear industry while 
maintaining national security. In the early years of the nuclear power program the power 
and weapons programs were a single entity. The early national security concerns limited 
commercial participation. Security measures required any company requesting nuclear 
information or technology to apply to the AEC. The AEC determined the potential 
security concerns of releasing the requested information (Allen, 1977). These restrictions 
hindered the program until the passage of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 when the 
weapons and power programs were separated (Allen, 1977). 
 
55 
The early data controls interfered with the AEC’s task of supporting 
private research through the contribution of industry (Allen, 1977). Competition among 
potential industry participants favored the few companies involved in nuclear programs 
during and shortly after World War II. These companies previously had access to 
restricted information and understood working with the AEC and its predecessors, thus 
giving them a unique advantage (Allen, 1977). The AEC recognized the need to include 
more companies in the development process and increase the availability of nuclear 
information to determine the viability of nuclear power in the generation of commercial 
power (Allen, 1977; Perry et al., 1977).   
 Despite the data release restrictions, one action by the AEC promoted 
participation by industry. Recognizing that utility and manufacturing companies would 
need to provide the funds necessary to commercialize the nuclear industry, the AEC 
developed the Industrial Participation Program (IPP; Allen, 1977). The purpose of the 
program was multi-faceted. The AEC needed to understand what phases of technology 
the new industry was in and how much further advancement would cost. The AEC 
needed to know what uses industry saw for nuclear power and how the AEC could 
encourage industry participation (Allen, 1977).  
Initially only four groups participated in the IPP, with companies such as 
Dow Chemical, Pacific Gas and Electric, and Bechtel Corporation leading the way. At 
the conclusion of the IPP, 12 groups performed engineering and design studies, 
developed budgets for R&D, and developed timelines for production of commercial 
nuclear power plants (Allen, 1977). The most important results of the IPP were the 
identification of barriers to further commercial development of nuclear power (Allen, 
1977). The IPP participants identified two major barriers to commercialization, both 
related to capital costs. AEC safety considerations required large isolation areas that were 
impractical for commercial use due to the cost of acquiring the land and the power lines 
to transmit the electricity to power grids (Allen, 1977). Further, the estimated capital 
costs of nuclear plant construction were cost prohibitive for industry. Industry leaders 
believed costs would decline as the nuclear industry matured, but none wanted to assume 
the costs of research and development (Allen, 1977). The results of the IPP contributed to 
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a reduction in the amount of land required to meet safety considerations and the 
establishment of the AEC’s Power Reactor Demonstration Program (PRDP), designed to 
demonstrate the costs and benefits of a commercial power reactor. 
The largest impact from the AEC is found in the mandate to conduct R&D 
and make available research laboratories unrestricted by the need to satisfy investors and 
unhindered by a need to show an immediate, real-world use (Allen, 1977). After 
assessing which issues were most important and could be handled by national labs, the 
AEC concentrated all design and engineering at the Argonne National Laboratory, one of 
the most important decisions in the technological development of the nuclear industry 
(Allen, 1977). 
While the establishment and initial mandates of the AEC did not lead to a 
rapid growth in the nuclear industry, they laid the groundwork for some of the most 
important decisions and programs in the growth of nuclear power. Restriction of 
information due to national security concerns initially hampered efforts to include more 
companies in the nuclear industry, but it also accelerated the separation of the weapons 
and power programs. Most important was the establishment of two programs that we will 
discuss further in terms of their economic and technological factors: the PRDP and the 
Argonne National Laboratory. As we will discuss, the PRDP and Argonne National 
Laboratory led to a marriage of industry and government that was key in the difficult and 
expensive early years of nuclear power.   
b. Political Factors and Nanotechnology 
In 2001, the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) created 
the National Nanotechnology Coordination Office and the National Nanotechnology 
Initiative (NNI; Roco, 2006). The NNI has led to synergistic, accelerated, and 
interdisciplinary development of nanotechnology while motivating academia and industry 
to jointly research and develop commercially viable nanotechnology and nanotechnology 




The NSTC serves as a virtual agency with a member on the cabinet of the 
president of the United States. Before creating the NNI, the NSTC conducted core 
nanotechnology research to identify nanotechnology concepts that included most 
scientific disciplines. The NSTC defined nanotechnology and identified key research 
directions prior to commencing any actual research (Roco, 2006). In order to assemble 
fragmented scientific disciplines and generate support for the NNI, the NSTC conducted 
various working groups that led to collaboration of scientists across most disciplines and 
generated a bottom-up research plan for the initial implementation of the NNI. The NNI 
ultimately included 25 federal government agencies and thousands of academic, industry, 
state, and local institutions (Roco, 2006). Finally, the NSTC created a long-term research 
plan structured in the manner of a science project. This science project structure 
established research priorities and levels (national, agency, industry, and R&D). The 
early stages of R&D focused on fundamental or basic research relevant to multiple 
applications (Roco, 2006). This research was freely available to all participants including 
industry (National Nanotechnology Coordination Office [NNCO], 2005).   
The NNI and the NNCO were formally established in 2001. The NNCO is 
responsible for coordinating research planning and budgeting between federal entities, 
private companies, and academic institutions (Miller, Serrato, & Represas-Cardenas, 
2004). Appendix A lists all the federal NNI participants as of 2012. In 2001, the NNI also 
refined the long-term goals for the first stage of the NNI. The revised goals included the 
following:  
• additional fundamental research goals driven by the outcomes of 
current research and the input of the organizations within the NNI;  
• creation of centers and networks of excellence responsible for 
encouraging research networking and sharing of files;  
• development of research infrastructure including funding for 
standardized metrology, instrumentation, and modeling and 
simulation equipment for all research facilities;  
• workforce education and training to develop the new generation of 
nanotechnology workers; and  
• the creation of grand challenges for nanotechnology (Miller et al., 
2004).   
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The NNI also created grand challenges incorporating several national-
level items of interest designed to encourage a national race for nanotechnology. These 
challenges included 
• shrinking the entire contents of the Library of Congress into a 
device the size of a sugar cube; 
• making materials from the bottom up, by building them from 
atoms and molecules; 
• developing materials 10 times stronger than steel, yet lighter, 
suitable for use in land, sea, air, and space vehicles; 
• using gene and drug delivery to deter cancerous cells by 
nanoengineered MRI contrast agents; 
• removing the finest contaminants from water and air; and   
• doubling the energy efficiency of solar cells (Miller et al., 2004). 
In 2006, Dr. Roco, a member of the NNI, discussed the successes of the 
NNI between 2001 and 2005. He stated, 
What are the major outcomes after five year [FY2001 to FY2005] of the 
NNI?  The R&D landscape for nanotechnology R&D has changed, 
advancing from fragmented fields and questions such as “what is 
nanotechnology?” and “could it ever be developed?” to a highly 
competitive domain where the main question is “how industry and 
medicine can take advantage of it faster?”  In only five years, nanoscience 
and nanotechnology have opened an era of integration of fundamental 
research and engineering, increased technological innovation and enabled 
a base for improving human health. For this reason government and 
industry investments worldwide have increased five-fold in five years, 
reaching about $4.1 billion in 2005 from about $825 million in 2000, and 
all Fortune 500 companies working in materials, electronics, and 
pharmaceuticals have made investment in nanotechnology. The NNI fuels 
these developments. By creating a “power house” of discoveries and 
innovations, the NNI has been the major driver for nanoscience and 
nanotechnology developments and applications within the United States 
and the world. In 2005, NNI supported over 4,000 projects and 60 new 
centers of excellence for networks and user facilities in the United States. 
Over $8 billion is now invested worldwide by governments and industry 




In 2006 the NNI shifted focus from purely basic research and began to 
include some applied research (Roco, 2006). The focus became the vertical integration 
with industry in order to align research efforts with societal needs and aspirations.   
The NNI’s coordination of nanotechnology R&D profoundly impacted the 
growth of the nanotechnology industry. The NNI focused R&D efforts by creating 
specific goals and challenges for the government, private industry, and academia. The 
NNI created a clearing house for information developed during the early stages of 
nanotechnology under the NSTC, and made it accessible to any entity involved in 
nanotechnology development. Focus and information sharing were key to the rapid 
growth of nanotechnology investment over a five-year period and a shift to applied 
research geared toward use of nanotechnology in society. 
c. Generalized Findings 
Nuclear power and nanotechnology are products of very different political 
environments that both achieved commercial success. We found both programs were in 
essence national organizations leading commercialization efforts. The nuclear power 
program was spearheaded by the AEC, while the nanotechnology program was led by the 
NNI. The activities undertaken by the AEC and the NNI can be represented by four 
common elements: 
• established long-term goals based on national-level items of 
interest; 
• incorporated government, industry, and academia into a national 
research group;  
• shared information freely among participants; and 
• established policy regarding research and use of developed 
technology. 
These factors are representative of a National Innovation System (NIS). 
The NIS concept was first proposed more than 20 years ago by Christopher Freeman 
(1981) while he studied Japan’s post-WWII rise to an economic superpower. Freeman 
(1981) was the first to use the idea of an NIS; however, there is no agreed-upon definition 
of an NIS. Building upon Freeman’s NIS concept, we defined an NIS as a framework 
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established at the national level to encourage and promote innovation and commercial 
development of technology to support national goals.  
It is impossible to say if nuclear power and nanotechnology could have 
reached commercialization without an NIS. However, we believe that without an NIS the 
development of commercial nuclear power and nanotechnology would have faced greater 
opportunities for failure, taken longer to develop, and resulted in a fragmented industry.   
2. Economic Factors 
Research and development of new or highly innovative technology require large 
amounts of capital. Private industry must show that a new technology has a sustainable, 
practical use to convince investors to contribute large amounts of capital towards research 
and development. Governments are not always constrained by this need to show an 
immediate practical use and are not controlled by a need to turn a profit. Therefore, 
government and industry partnerships develop to accelerate the growth of an industry. 
a. Economic Factors and Nuclear Power 
Capital cost was the key financial issue that limited industry interest and 
participation in the early development of nuclear power. Industry leaders believed 
building a nuclear power plant was too expensive for privately held firms to support 
(Allen, 1977). Industry leaders believed only the government had the necessary funds to 
construction a nuclear power plant. Congress provided the groundwork for nuclear 
cooperation between the government and private industry in the 1954 Atomic Energy 
Act. The Atomic Energy Act stated, 
Many technological problems remain to be solved before widespread 
atomic power, at competitive prices, is a reality. It is clear to us that 
continued Government research and development, using Government 
funds, will be indispensable to a speedy and resolute attack on these 
problems. It is equally clear to us, however, that the goal of atomic power 
at competitive prices will be reached more quickly if private enterprise, 
using private funds, is now encouraged to play a far larger role in the 
development of atomic power than is permitted under existing legislation. 
In particular, we do not believe that any developmental program carried 
out solely under government auspices, no matter how efficient it may be, 
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can substitute for the cost-cutting and other incentives of free and 
competitive enterprise. (p. 751) 
In response to industry concerns about the capital costs of nuclear power, the AEC 
established the Power Reactor Demonstration Program (PRDP; Allen, 1977).  
The PRDP began in January of 1955 and was broken into four phases. 
Phases One and Two ran concurrently with Phase One involving large corporations and 
Phase Two involving small public companies. Phase Three limited participants to 
demonstrable nuclear technology. The fourth phase required industry to submit designs 
capable of producing 400MWe of power using a light water reactor design. The goal of 
the PRDP was “to bring private resources into the development of engineering 
information on the performance of nuclear reactors and to advance the time when nuclear 
power will become economically viable” (Perry et al., 1977).  
To encourage industry participation in the PRDP, the AEC recognized the 
need to offset industry R&D costs. To accomplish this, the AEC 
• waived nuclear fuel use charges, 
• conducted R&D on behalf of industry using government labs and 
research equipment free of charge,  
• required companies to openly share research information in benefit 
of the nuclear program, 
• paid for reactor construction for small utility companies in Phase 
Two, and, 
• in Phase Four, focused industry on the light water reactor (Allen, 
1977). 
The PRDP encouraged industry development of nuclear power by 
reducing capital costs associated with the research, design, and production of nuclear 
power and focused industry on the proven design of the light water reactor. Focusing on 
the light water reactor further reduced development costs by reducing the number of 
outstanding reactor designs from six to one.  
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b. Economic Factors and Nanotechnology 
Federal government spending for nanotechnology was $14.9 billion 
between FY1997 and FY2012 (American Association for the Advancement of Science 
[ROCO], 2009; Miller et al., 2004). Large federal government spending administered 
through a national innovation system such as the NNI has provided funding for basic and 
applied R&D critical for the development of commercial nanotechnological products. 
The importance of government funding can be seen in the words of Mr. William P. 
Moffitt, CEO, Nanosphere, Inc., and Dr. Mark Melliar-Smith, CEO of Molecular 
Imprints. Both testified before Congress on March 11, 2008 (U.S. House, Subcommittee 
on Science and Technology, 2008), about the vital importance government research 
played in the development of their respective nanotechnology-based products. Moffitt 
said, 
Nanosphere was founded in 2000, based upon nanotechnology discoveries 
made by Northwestern University in Evanston, Illinois. We have taken 
basic science, funded by the NIH and NSF [part of the NNI] out of the 
university research setting and translated it into a diagnostics platform that 
delivers three distinct economic values. First, the ability to move complex 
genetic testing into mainstream medicine; second, early detection of 
diseases, such as cardiovascular disease, cancer, and neurodegenerative 
diseases, as nanoparticle probes improve detection sensitivity by orders of 
magnitude; third, the potential to test for disease where no tests exist 
today. Moreover, while we are focused on medical diagnostics, this same 
technology platform is applicable to biosecurity, agriculture, food safety 
testing, and industrial contamination control. Nanotechnology has a 
potential to shift markets on a global economy and replace or greatly 
modify existing leadership positions. (p. 41)  
Moffitt’s statement shows the impact NNI basic research played in 
Nanosphere’s growth and the recognition of nanotechnology’s potential to generate new 
economically viable products. Recognition of the potential economic benefits associated 
with nanotechnological production demonstrated the willingness of individual businesses 
to incorporate nanotechnology in order to generate income.   The idea that basic research 
conducted under the early stage of the NNI provided the initial idea of nanotechnology 
based products is further supported by the words of Mellinar-Smith (U.S. House, 2008). 
While speaking about his company, Molecular Imprints, he said, 
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We have also received extensive help from government-funded facilities. 
Recently, especially useful has been our access to state-of-the-art electron 
beam tools at the molecular foundry at Lawrence-Berkley National 
Laboratory in California. Government funding has been supplemented by 
over $60 million of venture capital and industry investment, and in fact, in 
my experience, I found no dichotomy between the two sources of funding. 
They seem to be synergistic and collaborative. We are grateful for all of 
this support. (p. 50) 
Mellinar-Smith’s comments again show the importance of government funding 
toward the initial commercialization of nanotechnology. In this case, Mellinar-Smith 
highlights that funding need not be in the form of direct investment. Instead, funding in 
the form of assistance from national laboratories and agencies provided the catalyst for 
initial commercial success. 
 The purpose of this March 11, 2008, Congressional hearing was to understand 
ongoing challenges for commercialization of nanotechnology and, ultimately, to 
understand how the government could assist industry in commercialization of 
nanotechnology (U.S. House, 2008). When asked by Congress, “What are the hurdles to 
commercialization of nanotechnology?” Moffitt said, 
First and foremost the lack of early stage capital for cutting-edge, 
translational research. Much of the government’s direct spending in 
nanotechnology has been on scientific discovery. It takes extensive capital 
to translate nanoscience discoveries into platform technologies and 
demonstrate the potential and commercial viability in order to attract 
capital required for commercialization. For example, at Nanosphere, up to 
the point of first commercial product launch, we invested over $100 
million in converting nanoscience to scalable product technology. Many 
great nonscientific discoveries fail to attract the extensive capital required 
for commercialization, and for this reason, the gap between the research 
lab and the product prototype is often referred to as the Valley of Death. 
There is a great need to balance spending on basic research and 
translational work or goal-oriented development programs and to focus 
such programs on specific areas with the greatest promise to benefit the 
national interest. (p. 42) 
Moffitt’s statement demonstrated the idea that government funding should 
include basic and applied research. Shortly after his testimony, the NNI increased its 
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spending on applied nanotechnology research programs (ROCO, 2009). Since 2009, 
nanotechnology applied research has resulted in 
• 1,000+ consumer products utilizing nanotechnology at the end of 
2011,  
• 54% of all new nanotechnology originating within the United 
States, 
• 18,000 nanotechnology patents being issued to U.S. companies 
between 2009 and 2011, and  
• 5,400 U.S. companies actively developing products based on 
nanotechnology (Shapira, Youtie, & Kay, 2011). 
Government funding was vital to early nanotechnology development. 
Basic research funded by the government and conducted by NNI partners laid the 
foundation for expansive applied research. Further investment and focus by the 
government in applied nanotechnology research helped defray costs that may have kept 
industry from investing in nanotechnology research. This led to explosive growth over a 
short period of time, making the U.S. a leader in nanotechnology. 
c. Generalized Findings 
The common economic thread found in the development of nuclear power 
and nanotechnology is an industry leader reluctance to fund research and development, 
especially applied research. The reluctance to invest in research can be traced to private 
industry’s responsibility to investors. Private firms need to show investors that a practical 
use exists for any new technology the company wants to develop in order to secure 
funding. Without a practical use, investors may be hesitant to fund developing 
technologies. The PRDP helped industry realize the practical application of the nuclear 
reactor by offsetting the development of various reactor designs, ultimately developing 
the light water reactor that proved economically viable. Government investment into 
basic and applied R&D by the NNI removed industry burden to invest in an unproven 
technology. Basic research in nanotechnology structures and manipulation provided the 
foundation for industry development of commercial nanotechnology products by 
reducing capital costs. 
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3. Technological Factors 
Private industry guards its research and development in ways similar to countries 
guarding state secrets. Without sharing of information, the potential for duplicate 
research and effort can waste resources and time, slowing the development of new 
technology, increasing costs and time to commercialization.  
a. Technological Factors and Nuclear Power 
When the AEC was established in 1946, research into nuclear energy for 
civilian use was still in its infancy. Numerous technical questions required answers. Fuel 
behavior, safety concerns, moderator types, and nuclear theory were still in development 
(Allen, 1977). To answer these questions, the AEC was tasked with determining 
• what to study and fund,  
• where to conduct research, and  
• how to coordinate research (Allen, 1977).  
To accomplish these tasks, the AEC centralized nuclear design and 
engineering at the Argonne National Laboratory (Allen, 1977). 
The Argonne National Laboratory supervised all federal atomic energy at 
various sites around the country. This included the Materials Test Reactor (MTR) and 
Experimental Breeder Reactor, both located in Idaho, and the intermediate power breeder 
located at GE’s site in Schenectady, NY (Allen, 1977). The MTR was used to test 
materials, fuels, and coolant in an operational reactor and provided familiarity with light 
water reactors while the Experimental Breeder Reactor led to new components, materials, 
and maintenance practices (Allen, 1977). 
Centralizing the control of information and projects meant that projects 
working in different areas of the country were not disjointed, allowing for more efficient 
research. This was key during the development of the submarine reactor for the Navy. 
While GE and Westinghouse were competing with different designs to use on 
submarines, they both had access to the pool of research and information at Argonne 
(Allen, 1977). Because of this, the programs had similar beginning points in the basics of 
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nuclear energy and could spend less time on R&D. The light water reactor designed for 
the submarine program became the basis for all commercial reactors in the U.S.   
Centralization of nuclear R&D at the Argonne National Laboratory was 
key to early nuclear power development. Research was focused and shared, leading to 
cheaper initial development costs for industry. Centralized information also allowed 
companies to move to practical applications sooner. The early knowledge and experience 
gained with the light water reactor established the reactor as a stable design, a key in the 
final PRDP phase towards commercialization.     
b. Technological Factors and Nanotechnology 
Nanotechnology development was slowed by a lack of processes and 
technologies to facilitate collaboration across diverse fields. Additionally, the supply of 
standard lab equipment was insufficient for the rapid increase of nanotechnology research 
and the ever-changing laboratory equipment needs (Roco, 2006). To facilitate 
collaboration among the various entities involved in nanotechnology research, the NNI 
established the National Nanotechnology Initiative Network (NNIN; Roco, 2006). The 
self-described mission of the NNIN is the following: 
The National Nanotechnology Initiative Network is an integrated 
networked partnership of user facilities, supported by the National Science 
Foundation, serving the needs of nanoscale science, engineering and 
technology. 
The mission of NNIN is to enable rapid advancements in science, 
engineering and technology at the nano-scale by efficient access to 
Nanotechnology infrastructure. We provide shared open, geographically 
distributed laboratories, each with specific areas of technical excellence, 
and provide fabrication, synthesis, characterization, and integration 
resources to build structures, devices, and systems from atomic to complex 
large-scales. Our users belong to diverse areas: astronomy, plant 
pathology, materials science, physics, chemistry, life-sciences, various 
branches of engineering, etc., and come from academe, national 
laboratories, and industry. Projects may be short term or long term, from 
Academic or Industry, and range from pure research to prototype product 
development. Users can perform research on-site using facility equipment, 
training and staff support. For many tasks, remote usage is also feasible. 
External users typically spend a week or two, or commute, to complete 
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their work although longer visits are possible. We help users succeed by 
providing strong pre-visit technical interaction, mechanisms that let users 
protect their intellectual property, and strong training and knowledge 
support. (NNI, 2012) 
The NNIN provides a network of research centers specializing in various 
technical aspects of nanotechnology. Each center contains fully equipped laboratories 
that can be used by any organization conducting nanotechnological research. 
Development of the NNIN has evolved as collaboration technology has involved. The 
ubiquity of the Internet has increased the availability of the NNIN resources. 
Outdated equipment and lack of cooperation hampered early 
nanotechnology growth. The NNIN laboratories provided NNI organizations with 
modern equipment and a cooperative research environment that encouraged the open 
sharing of information among participants.  
c. Generalized Findings 
When the nuclear power and nanotechnology industries were in the early 
stages of development, duplicate research and lack of communication slowed both 
programs. This was addressed by the establishment of centralized infrastructures for the 
development of the two industries. The Argonne National Laboratory served as a control 
center for the early development of nuclear power while the NNIN established a network 
of specialized research centers. These centralization allowed different companies and 
research sites to access information and technology from other sites. This collaboration 
minimized time lost when issues arose because the issues could be simultaneously 
addressed from multiple angles while also reducing costs to individual firms because 
much of the information they needed was easily accessed.        
4. Environmental and Social Factors 
We combined the environmental and social factors and addressed them together. 
The idea that environmental factors are a concern arises from societal concern about the 
environment. Therefore, environmental and social factors are closely interwoven and 
worthy of discussion as one unit.  
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How an industry will impact the environment is generally unknown at the 
beginning of technology development and often slows social acceptance of the new 
technology. Conversely, if an older, related industry is viewed in a positive fashion, the 
new industry may experience social acceptance before environmental concerns are 
addressed. Addressing environmental and social concerns or misgivings early and often 
helps new industries reach social acceptance.  
a. Environmental/Social Factors and Nuclear Power 
Today, many associate the environmental effects of nuclear power with 
the Three Mile Island incident of 1979, the Chernobyl meltdown of 1986, and the 
Fukishima disaster of 2011. In the early years of nuclear power, most people did not 
know or think about the environmental and social issues of nuclear power. Most looked 
at nuclear power as “clean” energy, especially compared to coal-powered plants 
(Ga’ndara, 1977). The government, recognizing the unknown risks involved in the 
commercialization of nuclear power, included public safety in the mandate for the AEC 
(Rolph, 1977). 
Immaturity of early reactor technology meant establishing consistent 
standards for location, construction, and operation. The measures established were not 
objective but subjective to the plant being built and were designed to ensure public safety 
and confidence in nuclear power (Rolph, 1977). Small reactors, containment vessels, and 
distance from population centers would serve to minimize the effects of a nuclear 
incident, not prevent one. The public did not pay much attention to the regulations put 
forth by the AEC (Rolph, 1977) regarding nuclear safety. The public noted the immediate 
difference on the environment between nuclear power and coal-powered plants. Coal 
plants visibly polluted the air and needed fuel storage and transportation facilities, while 
mining for coal was also coming under scrutiny, making nuclear power more appealing to 
companies (Ga’ndara, 1977).   
Early nuclear power development was not hampered by modern-day 
societal concerns of radiation release and disposal. Still, the AEC recognized potential 
issues and incorporated basic safety concerns into licensing requirements. Of more 
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concern to the general public was the growing recognition of pollution from coal-
powered plants. The concerns about coal plants led to a greater public acceptance of 
nuclear power, encouraging companies to build nuclear reactors. 
b. Environmental/Social Factors and Nanotechnology 
In 2003 and 2004, society accepted a future in which nanotechnology is 
used to produce consumer products; however, there was recognition that potential 
occupational and health hazards associated with nanotechnology exist. The lack of 
information describing the health and environmental risks of manufactured nanoparticles 
and nanomaterials was an area requiring further study (Dreher, 2004). The 
nanotechnology industry had two options for dealing with societal concerns about the 
potential environmental and health implications of nanotechnology. In 2004, two 
toxicology studies of nanoparticles found that nanoparticles produced lung lesions and 
pulmonary granulomas in laboratory mice. Further studies demonstrated that existing 
OSHA exposure standards did not provide adequate protection from nanoparticles 
(Dreher, 2004). These examples of the potential health concerns regarding nanoparticles 
came to light in 2003 and 2004. In response, the NNI had two possible actions regarding 
societal concerns. First, they could ignore society’s concerns and continue with 
nanotechnology research. Second, they could accept the concerns and integrate 
environmental and health impacts of nanotechnology into the research structure 
(Brumfiel, 2003).    
The NNI realized that ignoring societal concerns was not a viable method 
to ensure the continued research and commercialization of nanotechnology. The NNI 
cited the example of transgenic crops (Brumfiel, 2003). Transgenic crops were 
introduced in 1982 and almost immediately came under fire from the public. Producers of 
transgenic crops in the early years chose to insist that the crops were safe and not to 
conduct additional research into the long-term impacts of genetically modified crops 
(Brumfiel, 2003). The result was a public who shunned transgenic crops, ultimately 
delaying the advancement and commercialization of the industry (Brumfiel, 2003). In 
response to societal concerns about nanotechnology, the EPA, NIH, National Toxicology 
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Program, and the National Institute of Environmental Health (NIEH) identified five 
nanotechnological environmental and health areas requiring further study, which were 
incorporated into the NNI research plan: 
• exposure risks to manufactured nanoparticles; 
• toxicology of manufactured nanoparticles; 
• extrapolation of nanoparticle toxicity using existing nanoparticle 
data; 
• environmental and biological fate, transport, persistence, and 
transformation of nanoparticles; and 
• recyclability and sustainability of manufactured nanomaterials 
(Dreher, 2004). 
The NNI also established the annual Nanotechnology Environmental and 
Health Implications (NEHI) working group that brought government and academic 
research together with industry. The outcome of these annual NEHI meetings was as 
follows: 
• research emphasis on addressing unexpected consequences of 
nanotechnology by anticipation and corrective actions; 
• programs designed to increase public awareness of nanotechnology 
and the results of environmental and health studies; 
• integration of social scientists, economists, and the public into 
integrated teams working with researchers; and 
• commencement of nanotechnological projects exploring the social 
implications of nanotechnology. Appendix B lists the social 
problems and nanotechnology contributions (Roco & Bainbridge, 
2005). 
The NNI recognized potential societal and environmental concerns early 
in nanotechnology development. Instead of ignoring these concerns, the NNI established 
specific environmental and social research areas. It also established an annual workgroup 
to address potential consequences of nanotechnology growth. These increased public 
acceptance of nanotechnology by accepting and mitigating society’s concerns about the 
impacts of nanotechnology.  
 
71 
c. Generalized Findings 
Society generally decides when an environmental issue becomes a 
decision factor in industry. We have seen this recently in the rise of green technologies 
such as electric and hybrid automobiles as more people become concerned with their 
carbon footprint. Likewise, nuclear power enjoyed early social acceptance because of 
environmental effects caused by coal-fired power plants.  
More importantly, though, we see proactive steps taken by the government 
to address potential concerns or issues. The addition of the five factors requiring further 
study in the NNI research plan addressed the concerns of the public, while early licensing 
requirements for nuclear power plants took into account the relative unknown dangers of 
nuclear power by reviewing requests based on size, location, and containment. While the 
actions taken for these two programs may not provide protection for the public, they 
helped alleviate concerns, reducing resistance and accelerating social acceptance.   
5. Legal Factors 
One of the most important legal factors in business is ownership. Ownership of 
technology or equipment gives a company the freedom to determine how they will use 
the technology with little or no interference from the government or outside companies. 
In nuclear power and nanotechnology, we continue to see ownership play a key role in 
encouraging industry participation. 
a. Legal Factors and Nuclear Power 
When originally established by the 1946 Atomic Energy Act, the AEC had 
cognizance over military and civilian atomic energy uses. The overriding task assigned to 
the AEC was to ensure information pertaining to nuclear energy was released only if such 
information would not jeopardize national security (Perry et al., 1977). Information 
security was a hindrance to industry because the application process was arduous (Allen, 
1977). Industry was not permitted to use or own material required to make nuclear fuel, 
known as fissionable material, or own and operate nuclear reactors (Allen, 1977). The 
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AEC informed Congress that these policies negatively affected industry interest, leading 
to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. 
The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 was intended to encourage industry to 
take a greater role in early development of nuclear power. The Atomic Energy Act of 
1954 allowed industry to own reactors and use (but not own) nuclear materials, enabled 
easier access to information, eased patenting requirements, and authorized the AEC to 
provide financial and research assistance (Allen, 1977). The AEC was also prohibited 
from building reactors for the generation of commercial electricity (Allen, 1977). While 
these changes did not lead to a rush of industry participation in nuclear power, they 
established the groundwork for the PRDP, as discussed in the Economic Factors and 
Nuclear Power section.    
Government control and ownership of nuclear materials and reactors acted 
as deterrents to private industry investment in early nuclear power development. Relaxing 
these requirements in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 laid the groundwork for the PRDP 
and legalized private ownership of a nuclear reactor. 
b. Legal Factors and Nanotechnology 
Industry is reluctant to spend money, time, and effort developing 
nanotechnology when ownership of intellectual property is unclear. Nanotechnology’s 
legal challenges concerned the ownership of nanotechnology, specifically, the ownership 
of research by industries receiving funding from the federal government and technology 
spun off from academic institutions (Newberger, 2003). Nanotechnology also 
experienced conflicts with the idea of academic early disclosure. Industry faced a similar 
disclosure issue. Often the nanotechnology industry needed additional capital to exploit 
research gains. This capital required disclosure of research results, often times before 
patents were filed (Newberger, 2003). Before nanotechnology research could be expected 
to return commercializable results, the following ownership questions had to be 
answered: 
• explain the relationship between government funding and 
ownership of intellectual property,   
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• understand how to protect industry intellectual property and allow 
industry to seek additional capital, and 
• define nanotechnology in regards to patent application 
(Newberger, 2003; O’Neill, Hermann, Klein, Landes, & Bawa, 
2007). 
The passage of the Bayh-Dole amendments (Patent Act, 1980) to the 
Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 200–212, allows business entities and non-profit organizations to 
retain intellectual property ownership rights for federal government-sponsored research. 
The passage of the Bayh-Dole amendments (Patent Act, 1980) effectively solved the 
ownership issues arising from government-sponsored research. 
Industry continually faces pressure to disclose intellectual property found 
during nanotechnology research in order to receive outside capital to continue 
development (Newberger, 2003). One such method is the use of provisional patent 
applications. Provisional patent applications allow the filing of an early patent purely to 
protect the “art” or the idea of the patent from later filing. Provisional patents are not true 
patents; they serve only to protect the intellectual property for 12 months while a full 
patent application is submitted. Provisional patents allow industry to file for patent 
protection in order to disclose a discovery or research finding in order to seek capital. At 
the end of the 12-month period, a full patent application must have been received by the 
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) or the provisional patent expires (USPTO, 
2013). 
The granting of nanotechnology patents, provisional or otherwise, was 
compounded by the number of patents filed for demonstration purposes, and a lack of 
standard nanotechnology terminology leading  to vague and overlapping patents (O’Neill 
et al., 2007). Many companies found their nanotechnology patents effectively worthless 
due to the vagueness of early nanotechnology patent vocabulary. To solve this problem, 
the USPTO partnered with industry, academia, and government nanotechnology experts 
to help solve the patent problem (O’Neill et al., 2007).   The USPTO also partnered with 
the Institute of Nanotechnology to develop standard terminology. In 2007, the USPTO 
created a unique patent class for nanotechnology. These nanotechnology standards 
prevented companies from using and patenting ideas such as nanoparticle and 
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nanostructure, items considered basic knowledge within the nanotechnology industry. 
Training of USPTO patent examiners in nanotechnology vocabulary further reduced the 
granting of vague and overlapping patents (O’Neill et al., 2007). 
Intellectual property is in some cases more important to industry than 
physical property. The ability for a company to claim a product or advancement as its 
own is essential to obtaining funds. Companies were slow to receive private investment 
due to a fear of being unable to receive economic gain from nanotechnology. The 
government recognized these concerns and took action. Through legislation and changes 
to patent laws, the intellectual property rights of new discoveries and government-funded 
research were protected to encourage industry participants to continue nanotechnology 
development. 
c. Generalized Findings 
No matter the field, industry needs assurance that the results of resources 
spent developing new technology will belong to the company. Potential competition, 
especially from the government, can keep companies from investing in research and 
development. In both Nuclear Power and Nanotechnology, ownership concerns were 
addressed through Congressional action or new regulations. The Atomic Energy Act of 
1954 prevents the AEC from owning reactors to sell electricity, removing government as 
a potential competitor. The Bayh-Dole amendments (Patent Act, 1980) provide industry 
ownership of technology developed using federal dollars. Intellectual property was 
protected in the private and academic sectors by changes made in the patenting process. 
These government actions encouraged industry investment in nuclear power and 
nanotechnology. 
6. Summary of Generalized Findings 
Through our PESTEL analysis of nuclear power and nanotechnology, we 
identified the key elements of each PESTEL factor for each industry. We determined the 
similarities between the factors of each case, and identified generalized findings for 
comparison to biofuels.   The generalized findings are summarized in Table 5. 
 
75 
Factor Generalized Findings 
Political National innovation system 
Economic Practical application and sufficient R&D funding 
Environmental/Social Social acceptance 
Technology Centralized research infrastructure 
Legal Ownership 
Table 5.   Generalized Commercialization Factors From Nuclear Power and 
Nanotechnology 
A National Innovation System such as the Atomic Energy Commission or the 
National Nanotechnology Initiative encourages industry participation in programs of 
national interest. This encouragement can be in the form of funding, research assistance, 
or sharing of information, and is designed to streamline a new technology’s development. 
This NIS may provide sufficient R&D funding and help identify a practical application 
for a new technology earlier than if industry was developing the technology alone. 
Additionally, a centralized research infrastructure such as the Argonne National 
Laboratory and the NNIN, intended to focus R&D and prevent overlap and repeat work, 
may be put in place by the NIS. These infrastructures lend themselves to more rapid 
growth of a new technology because they encourage sharing of ideas, new equipment, 
and potential problems among participants. Environmental issues are driven by societal 
concerns. This leads to the idea that social acceptance of a new industry, the industry’s 
potential effects, and the steps taken by the government and industry to address and 
mitigate these effects is paramount to successful commercialization. Finally, legal 
ownership of property, both physical and intellectual, encourages companies to enter 
early into a new technology. 
While two of these findings (practical application and sufficient R&D funding, 
and centralized research infrastructure) can be identified as having been spawned from 
another of the findings (national innovation system), all are important to 
commercialization of an industry. Each appeals to a different concern for private industry 
involvement. Both nuclear power and nanotechnology were in the early stages of 
development when the government became involved. These factors contributed in some 
way to the development of both of these technologies.      
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B. COMPARISON TO OTHER LITERATURE 
In Chapter III, we discussed the use of triangulation to confirm our research 
findings. In this section we apply the idea of triangulation to our research results as 
highlighted in Table 5. We compared our research results to those found in five studies 
on commercialization success factors. The five studies chosen were the following: 
• “Technology Commercialization: Have We Learned Anything?” (Allen, 
2012), 
• “The Government’s Role in the Commercialization of New Technologies: 
Lessons for Space Policy” (Rose, 1986), 
• “Key Success Factors for R&D Project Commercialization” (Astebo, 
2003), 
• “An Integrative Model to Explain the Ability to Commercialize 
Innovations: Linking Networks, Absorptive Capacity, Ambidexterity and 
Environmental Factors” (Datta, 2011), and 
• “Innovation and Commercialization of Emerging Technology” (Office of 
Technology Assessment [OTA], 1995). 
These sources complement our triangulation strategy by providing alternate views 
to our research. Allen (2012), Rose (1986), and Datta (2011) present qualitative analysis 
of commercialization using frameworks that differ from the PESTEL framework. Astebro 
(2003) seeks to understand commercialization factors by using a statistical approach, thus 
bringing quantitative comparisons to our qualitative research. Finally, the OTA article 
presents a government take on commercialization. The varying research methods selected 
for comparison broadened the horizon for understanding commercialization. This method 
is known as convergent triangulation (Jick, 1979). 
Our findings for the environmental/social, technology, and legal factors were 
supported by these five sources, despite that fact that we used different terminology and 
analysis methods. In the remainder of this section, we discuss the political and economic 
factors influencing commercialization and present alternative suppositions as presented 
by the authors.   
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1. Political Factors 
We identified a national innovation system as the single most important political 
factor influencing commercialization of technology. A part of a national innovation 
system is a country’s academic institutions and their associated research.   
In her article “Technology Commercialization: Have We Learned Anything?,” 
Kathleen Allen discussed the role of universities in the commercialization of new 
technology. She presents the idea that academic inclusion in a national innovation system 
can actually reduce the rate of commercialization of new technologies (Allen, 2012). 
Allen cites the Bayh-Dole Act (Patent Act, 1980), which allows academic institutions to 
own the research findings of federal-funded programs, as the cause of brain drain at the 
university level (Allen, 2012). She attributed this brain drain to a desire by researchers to 
commercialize their research, which can only occur from within industry (Allen, 2012). 
She found this phenomenon occurred within all industries and academic research 
environments, but particularly those in high-tech fields such as biotechnology (Allen, 
2012). Moreover, she concludes that researchers who choose to remain within the 
academic environment are shifting from basic research to applied research, possibly 
undercutting the basic research required to make the next great technological advance 
(Allen, 2012).   
Nancy Rose presented an alternative view to the importance of national 
innovation systems in her article “The Government’s Role in the Commercialization of 
New Technologies: Lessons for Space Policy.”  Rose directly challenges the idea of 
government involvement in commercialization. She said, “Government policies to hasten 
commercialization of a technology typically are quite costly relative to their 
accomplishments, and frequently are counter-productive to their objective” (p. 114). 
Her first argument against government involvement in commercialization rejects 
the idea that market failures result in commercially viable projects failing to 
commercialize. She cited her case study of 24 federally funded demonstration projects 
including the Super Sonic Transport (SST), Clinch River breeder reactor, and a variety of 
Synfuel projects that failed to produce commercially viable products. Her study found 
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that the percentage of non-governmental investment was a key indicator in determining 
which projects would ultimately be successful (Rose, 1986). She attributed the 
willingness of industry to invest in a project as a direct correlation to the project’s 
potential for commercial success and said, “Industry reluctance to provide capital for 
commercial development is therefore a signal of the project’s discouraging economics 
rather than a market failure” (p. 114). 
Rose’s second argument against government involvement in commercialization 
questions the true economic benefits of accelerated technology development. While early 
adoption of new technology may provide political benefits, it may not be the best path to 
ensure commercialization (Rose, 1986). She supported her argument by looking at the 
aircraft industry at the end of the 1940s. Germany and Britain both produced an 
operational jet fighter by 1944. However, the United States may have realized second- 
mover advantages by following and not producing an operational jet fighter until 1945/46 
(Rose, 1986). Specifically, the U.S. began production with an understanding of jet 
propulsion, including efficiency and structural fatigue not available to Germany or the 
United Kingdom. Providing another example, she said, “Perhaps the strongest example of 
potential second-mover advantages is Japan’s success in high technology commercial 
enterprise, even though that nation rarely has been at the forefront of technology 
invention and innovation” (p. 114). 
The alternate ideas proposed by Allen and Rose in their studies conflict with our 
research findings by suggesting that government involvement does not accelerate 
commercialization. Rather than choosing to disregard our work, or disregard the work of 
Allen and Rose, we accept their findings as an indication that the political environment is 
complex. Often times, political actions have negative externalities such as the academic 
brain drain presented by Allen. Sometimes the achievement of a grand scientific 
accomplishment, such as those proposed by the AEC or the NNI, has benefits that 
outweigh the purely economic analysis presented by Rose.    
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2. Economic Factors 
We concluded that the most important economic factor in the successful 
commercialization of new technology is recognition of practical application and 
sufficient funding to continue development. Thomas Astebro disagrees. 
In his article, “Key Success Factors for R&D Project Commercialization,” he uses 
statistical regression to determine which factors influence technology commercialization. 
His model suggests that 80.9% of commercialization behavior can be explained by the 
factors of expected profitability (practical application), technological opportunity (capital 
availability), legal protection (ownership), and development risk (Astebro, 2003). 
Development risk is not an economic factor represented in our PESTEL analysis and is 
worthy of discussion. Astebro defined development risk as the inherent risk of 
developing a new and untested technology expressed in economic terms (Astebro, 2003).   
  In “An Integrative Model to Explain the Ability to Commercialize Innovations: 
Linking Networks, Absorptive Capacity, Ambidexterity and Environmental Factors,” 
Avimanyu Datta (2011) provides an alternate explanation for economic factors 
influencing commercialization of technology. Datta (2011) suggests that the type of 
economic market plays a large role in the potential success of commercialization. Type of 
market refers to either an existing technology market or a new market created by a new 
technology (Datta, 2011). Regardless of the technology being commercialized, Datta 
suggested that entering an existing market is more difficult than creating a new market 
and those firms creating a new market are more likely to successfully commercialize a 
product (Datta, 2011).  
The ideas proposed by Astebro and Datta complement our research. We 
simplified our research and selected the most important economic factor based on our 
cases. Astebro and Datta’s research indicates that the economics of commercialization are 
complex. When compared with our research, their research identifies additional economic 
variables that should be included when attempting to understand successful 
commercialization.   
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C. BIOFUEL COMMERCIALIZATION 
1. Political Factors and Biofuel 
Efforts to commercialize the biofuel industry were initiated by the federal 
government in a manner similar to nuclear power and nanotechnology. The DoE and the 
DoA are the lead government agencies responsible for the current biofuel effort. In 
Chapter II, we discussed the Aquatic Species Program which ran from 1970 to 1996, and 
the current biomass program administered by the DoE Office of Energy Efficiency and 
Renewable Energy (EERE; DoE, 2012).  
Annually, the DoA and DoE host the Biomass Research and Development 
Initiative, where the Biomass Research and Development Technical Advisory Committee 
(TAC) hold public workshops designed to promote the development of biomass-based 
products. The TAC charter lists three official functions of the committee: 
• advise the Secretary of Energy and the Secretary of Agriculture on the 
technical focus and direction of requests and proposals issued under the 
biomass initiative;  
• facilitate consultations and partnerships among federal and state agencies, 
agricultural producers, industry, consumers, the research community, and 
other interested groups to carry out activities related to the biomass 
initiative; and 
• evaluate and perform strategic planning for initiative activities (DoE, 
2012). 
The joint DoE and DoA biomass industry development efforts have several 
elements in common with our definition of an NIS; however, they differ in several ways. 
First, the biomass program does not focus solely on the development of biofuels. Biofuels 
are a relatively minor subset of the biomass industry and are not the primary focus of the 
biomass program. Second, no single government organization is responsible for the 
development and commercialization of biofuels. The combined DoE and DoA program 
often leads to confusion among various agencies in academia, government, and industry, 
regarding research priorities and specific agency roles (DoE, 2012). The fragmented 
nature of the biofuel research effort leads us to believe that it is less likely to result in 
commercially viable products within the desired timeframe. 
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2. Economic Factors and Biofuel  
Our research found that practical application and sufficient R&D investment were 
the key economic factors for commercialization of technology systems. Neither factor 
appears to be present in the biofuel case.   
Total federal funding for biofuel programs from 1997 to 2012 (15 years) was $4 
billion (DoE, 2012). Nanotechnology, in contrast, has received $14.9 billion in federal 
funding during the same time frame. This demonstrates a lack of sufficient R&D capital 
needed to quickly commercialize the biofuel industry. 
The relatively low price of fossil fuels continues to be a major hurdle for the 
development of biofuels. In late 2011, the U.S. Navy paid $26 per gallon for biofuel. 
During the same time, the price of military-grade diesel was $2.75 per gallon. Industry is 
unlikely to invest heavily in new technologies that do not provide practical application 
and clear economic benefit. In Chapter II, we discussed the growth in petroleum 
production throughout the world, driven by new technology in petroleum extraction. The 
ability to economically extract new sources of oil keeps the cost of petroleum low and is 
expected to continue into the foreseeable future. Low oil prices and proven oil extraction 
technology continue to discourage investment in biofuels and challenge the idea that 
biofuels are a practical and economically viable technology. Petroleum is a commodity 
and petroleum prices are set by worldwide supply and demand. Biofuels are a substitute 
to petroleum; however, they remain subject to worldwide supply and demand. While 
worldwide petroleum production is increasing, industry has no incentive to spend large 
amounts of time and money on an unproven product with questionable economic return. 
The lack of practical application of biofuels and limited federal investment in R&D 
appear to be hindering the commercialization of biofuels.   
3. Environmental/Social Factors 
Biofuel faces several environmental and social challenges to commercialization. 
As the population of the United States continues to become socially aware, it demands 
products and services that meet social responsibilities. In Chapter II, we discussed the 
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negative externalities of first-generation biofuel feedstocks such as corn and sugarcane. 
Those externalities are 
• long-term worldwide food price increases, 
• reduction of available land for growth of food supplies, and 
• increased carbon footprint due to clearing of land and reduction of carbon 
removal capacity. 
In our research, we expressed the idea that for commercialization to succeed 
government and industry must identify and incorporate environmental and social 
concerns in the research and development process. We see this incorporation of social 
concerns within the biofuel commercialization effort. In Chapter I, we introduced the 
Energy Policy Act of 2005. Under this act, the federal government requires biofuels to 
generate less life-cycle greenhouse gas than the traditional petroleum it replaces and caps 
the maximum production of biofuels based on first-generation feedstocks in order to 
reduce the impact on food prices. The limitations on first-generation feedstocks found in 
the Energy Policy Act of 2005 effectively create a demand for second-generation biofuels 
based on byproducts, feedstock capable of growing on marginal lands, and algae. The 
joint DoE and DoA TAC also includes an interagency workgroup responsible for 
identifying and mitigating the environmental and social impacts of biofuels (Biomass 
Research and Development Board [BRDB], 2012). The TAC environmental and social 
working group is responsible for promoting research activities designed to reduce biofuel 
life-cycle carbon emission and the human health impacts of biofuel (BRDB, 2012). 
The efforts described previously are a demonstration of the federal government’s 
acceptance of the need to address social concerns about biofuels. The subsequent laws 
and working groups promoting environmental and social awareness meet our definition 
of successful social factors likely to positively influence commercialization of biofuel.  
4. Technological Factors 
The biofuel industry does not operate under the umbrella of a single coordinating 
government entity. As discussed in Section C, Paragraph 1, of this chapter, the biofuel 
industry is loosely led by agreements between the DoE and DoA. While both 
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organizations desire to promote the open sharing of biofuel technology, we do not see the 
level of collaboration between industry seen in the nuclear power and nanotechnology 
cases. Without a strong cooperative influence, a system of collaboration for sharing of 
information and resources within the biofuel industry has not been created. No 
organization similar to the Argonne National Laboratory or the NNIN exists for the 
biofuel industry; thus sharing of technology and information depends mostly on the 
extent that industry chooses to create partnerships.  
The lack of collaborative technology does not mean the biofuel industry will not 
end with a commercialized product. However, it is likely that the process for 
commercialization is slowed as each company spends resources on basic and applied 
research, without gaining the efficiencies found in collaboration.  
5. Legal Factors 
Our key legal factor of ownership, or the ability to own the product created 
through research and development, is present in the biofuel industry. We see the idea of 
ownership in the 2,796 biofuel patents issued between 2002 and 2008. In 2006 and 2007, 
the number of patents issued in the biofuel industry increased by 150% per year. In 2007, 
the number of biofuel patents issued was 25% greater than the combined total of solar- 
and wind-power patents awarded (Ronald & Mandar, 2008). Biofuel industry intellectual 
property ownership is protected and benefits from the same laws as nuclear power and 
nanotechnology discussed in Section A, Paragraphs 5a and 5b, of this chapter.   
Clearly defined ownership of intellectual property associated with research and 
development spending is a key factor that leads to commercialization of a technology. 
Companies that successfully patent ideas in emerging technology markets such as 
biofuels establish industry standards, giving the company a high probability of emerging 
as a dominant player in the field (Wolek, 2011). In the case of biofuels, it is likely that 
the legal protection offered by U.S. patent laws, specifically laws such as the Bayh-Dole 
amendment (Patent Act, 1980), are encouraging commercialization of biofuel 
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VI. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
In Chapter V, we applied the PESTEL model to the nuclear power and 
nanotechnology industries to deduce the factors that lead to successful 
commercialization. We determined the following factors contributed to 
commercialization: 
• existence of a national innovation system,  
• practical application for new technology and sufficient R&D investment, 
• acceptance of social concerns about new technology, 
• existence of a collaborative technology for open sharing of research 
information and infrastructure, and  
• ownership rights for intellectual property. 
We compared these factors to the current state of the biofuel industry and found 
several areas where there is opportunity to improve the U.S. biofuel commercialization 
effort. The remainder of this chapter discusses our recommendations for improving the 
biofuel commercialization effort, the limitations of our study, and our recommended 
areas of further study. 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The following recommendations are based on our research regarding 
commercialization of nuclear power, nanotechnology, and biofuel. They are structured 
using the PESTEL framework which we used for our analysis. 
1. Political Recommendations 
Designate the DoE as the lead government organization responsible for 
commercialization of biofuels. The current partnership between the DoE and the DoA 
creates confusion among participants in government biofuel programs. The DoA plays a 
vital role in biofuel development due to the agricultural nature of biofuel; however, it 
does not have the background in energy policy. The DoA should remain involved in 
biofuel development, but as an advisor to the DoE. The biofuel working group should be 
separated from the annual biomass working group. Participants in the biofuel working 
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group should form the basis for the permanent DoE-led biofuel initiative. A separate 
biofuel working group (initiative) would be free from the limitations and agendas of the 
parent group. These changes would result in a unified biofuel innovation system that 
meets our definition of an innovation system introduced in Chapter V.  
2. Economic Recommendations 
Biofuels face stiff competition from traditional petroleum. As previously 
discussed, advances in petroleum extraction continue to result in adequate petroleum 
reserves to meet worldwide demand for the foreseeable future. Sufficient supply keeps 
worldwide petroleum prices relatively low, hindering biofuel’s ability to compete. Short 
of increasing taxes on oil or subsidizing biofuel, there is little the government can do to 
show a practical economic need for biofuel. We recommend that the government 
continue current subsidies for feedstocks deemed desirable to avoid wasting money and 
effort developing feedstocks causing negative externalities. Additionally, the government 
should shift biofuel spending from procurement to direct R&D spending. The current 
government model provides the majority of government investment through the purchase 
of usable biofuels. The purpose of this policy is to support emerging companies while 
they refine and develop production techniques required to produce commercially viable 
biofuel. The government believes these companies will be able to lower costs, either 
through economies of scale or through advancements in production technology. 
However, we believe that requiring companies to provide a useful end product the 
government actual retards the commercialization of biofuels by directing spending 
toward production instead of R&D. One promising biofuel feedstock is algae; however, 
current algae production is not economically viable due to the cost of production and the 
amount of oil produced by the algae. Rather than requiring algae producers to provide a 
usable end product, the government should directly fund the R&D of new algae 
production technologies and the genetic alteration of algae to produce more oil. This 
direct spending is more likely to result in commercialization of algae biofuel because it 
addresses why algae is not commercially viable. Direct government R&D spending does 
not require companies to invest in capital-intensive production facilities that may or may 
not be usable as production technology matures. 
 
87 
Government investment in biofuels is insufficient to generate rapid progress in 
commercialization. As discussed in Chapter V, $14.9 billion were spent on the 
development of nanotechnology between 1997 and 2012. Only $4 billion were spent on 
biofuels during the same period. Today we have a multitude of commercially viable 
nanotechnology products, while all biofuel products rely on some form of government 
(federal, state, or local) subsidy. The government should make a sizeable increase in the 
amount invested into biofuels, but only after implementing the organizational and policy 
changes recommended in the political and economic section of this thesis. 
3. Environmental/Social Recommendations 
The government must create a policy regarding identifying biofuel feedstocks 
allowed for use within the United States. Selection of feedstocks that minimize negative 
externalities is vital to the commercialization of biofuel. We recommend the DoE 
discourage biofuel research that uses first-generation feedstock such as corn, sugarcane, 
and other food-based feedstocks. These feedstocks compete directly with food supplies 
for resources, including land, and indirectly increase the cost of food. This negative effect 
has been seen in numerous studies in many countries. Use of food waste to generate 
biofuels should not be limited under this policy. Second- and third-generation feedstocks 
such as algae and jatropha do not increase food prices and can be grown on marginal 
lands, thus not competing for scarce agricultural resources. 
4. Technology Recommendations 
Create a centralized collaboration technology similar to the NNIN for sharing 
biofuel research and resources. This recommendation requires the implementation of the 
recommendations found in the political and economic sections. Once a preferred 
feedstock type is selected and government spending is focused on research versus 
procurement of biofuel a centralized collaboration structure is needed.   
5. Legal Recommendations 
Current intellectual property laws provide protection for companies and assurance 
that resources spent will result in ownership. It is up to the USPTO to recognize any 
 
88 
differences that may arise within the biofuel industry that require specific intervention to 
clarify and protect ownership, similar to the nanotechnology case.   
6. Summary 
In this paper we identified factors that influence commercialization of technology 
systems and applied them to the government biofuel effort. We used the PESTEL 
framework and a grounded theory case study methodology to analyze previous 
government commercialization endeavors. Using nuclear power and nanotechnology 
examples we identified key success factors and compared them to the biofuel effort. 
Finally, we recommended changes to improve the government biofuel effort. Table 6 
summarizes the lessons learned from nuclear power and nanotechnology as well as the 
recommendations for government biofuel program.   
Factor Lessons Learned from 




Political National innovation system (1) Designate DoE as 
government lead 
(2) Separate biofuel working 
group from biomass working 
group 
Economic Practical application and 
sufficient R&D funding 
(1) Shift biofuel spending from 
procurement to dedicated R&D 
(2) Increase federal biofuel 
R&D spending 
 
Environmental/Social Social acceptance Select feedstock with fewest 
negative externalities (algae, 
jatropha, etc.) to focus R&D 
efforts 
 
Technological Centralized research 
infrastructure 
Create centralized 
collaboration technology to 
share basic biofuel research 
Legal Ownership None, current patent laws 
sufficient 
Table 6.   Summary and Recommendations for Biofuel. 
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B. LIMITATIONS OF STUDY 
This section presents a consolidated list of the assumptions and limitations of this 
work. This section acknowledges these assumptions and limitations, and provides the 
reader with a list of additional topics for review.   
1. Assumptions 
The following assumptions were made during the course of this study: 
• biofuels are important to national security and are a national priority 
worthy of study; 
• government investment is required to commercialize the biofuel industry; 
• the biofuel industry is not currently operating in a commercially viable 
state; and 
• nuclear power and nanotechnology are examples of successful 
government-aided commercialization. 
2. Limitations 
We acknowledge the following limitations of our study: 
• our discussion of second-generation biofuel feedstock in Chapter II 
focuses primarily on algae, 
• our selection of successful commercialization cases was limited to nuclear 
power and nanotechnology, 
• no unsuccessful commercialization cases were reviewed, 
• application of only the PESTEL framework may not identify all relevant 
factors to commercialization, and  
• the identification of a single factor for each part of the PESTEL 
framework may not explain all commercialization behavior. 
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
Notable areas of study that are not included in this project but could have an 
impact on the commercialization of biofuel are listed, and should be considered for 
further study: 
• impact of government feedstock subsidies on the choice of feedstock 
research and development; 
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• the impact of oil prices on biofuel commercialization, including 
determination of the oil price that would make current biofuel production 
methods commercially viable; 
• the likely response of oil-exporting nations to the development of 
commercially viable biofuels within the United States and other nations; 
• under current pricing and cost models, what production capacity is 
required for various biofuel feedstock and production methods to be 
commercially viable; and 




A. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS PARTICIPATING IN 
THE NATIONAL NANOTECHNOLOGY INITATIVE 
 
Agricultural Research Service (ARS) 
Bureau of Industry and Security, Department of Commerce (BIS/DOC) 
Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) 
Department of Defense (DoD) 
Department of Education (DoEd) 
Department of Energy (DoE) 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
Department of Justice/National Institute of Justice (DOJ/NIJ) 
Department of State (DoS) 
Department of Transportation/Federal Highway Administration (DoT/FHWA) 
Department of Treasury (DoTreas) 
Department of Labor/Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(DOL/OSHA) 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) 
National Cancer Institute  
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 
National Institutes of Health (NIH) 
National Science Foundation (NSF) 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) 
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Forest Service (USDA/FS) 
U.S. Department of Agriculture, National Institute of Food and Agriculture 
(USDA/NIFA) 
U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) 
U.S. Intelligence Community 
U.S. Patent and Trade Office (USPTO) 












B. SOCIAL TRENDS AND POTENTIAL NANOTECHNOLOGICAL 
SOLUTIONS 
Social Problem Nanotechnological contribution to solution 
Healthcare and working capacity of 
aging population 
Convergence of nanotechnology with 
biotechnology; neurotechnology would address 
chronic illness, loss of sensorial capacity, and 
maintenance of work capability 
Collapse of birth rate in most 
advanced nations, below level required 
for population 
Convergence of nanotechnology with 
biotechnology to overcome infertility 
Poverty and inequality in under 
developed nations 
Economic progress, fueled by technological 
developments requiring systematic control of 
nanoscale process and materials 
Loss of jobs in advanced nations as 
work goes to nations with lower 
wages, weaker worker benefits, and 
worse workplace safety 
Progress in nanoscience will allow industrial 
nations to maintain quality of life, generate new 
domestic industries with high-quality jobs, even 
as poor nations benefit from globalization 
Threatened exhaustion of natural 
resources 
Nano-enabled technologies for improved 
efficiency in use of non-renewable resources, 
including energy production, water filtration, 
and invention of many high-quality nano-
fabricated substitute materials  
Environmental degradation, including 
global warming 
Reduced pollution from more efficient use of 
materials; specific new pollution remediation 
nanotechnologies; improved environmental 
monitoring by means of nano-enabled sensor 
nets 
World political instability threatens the 
gains achieved by newly democratic 
nations 
Stability requires technology that can offer 
abundance to a majority of people in all 
societies with existing natural resources; 
nanotechnology enables greater resource 
efficiency 
Security issues within industrial 
nations 
Numerous specific nanotechnology-based 
solutions, such as sensors to detect bioterrorism 
substances; inexpensive “smart labels” to deter 
theft of valuable goods; armor and vehicle 
components from nano-structure materials 
 
Cultural chaos in a post-industrial, 
post-modern pluralist society 
Nanotechnology will permit rapid progress in 
technologies of computation, communication, 
and creativity to sustain a culture of 
connectivity, equal access to information, and 
myriad subcultures simultaneously 
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Social Problem Nanotechnological contribution to solution 
In medicine, diminishing returns from 
research; rising cost of healthcare 
Fresh approaches to disease diagnoses and 
treatment from nanotechnology; prevention of 
disease from better nutrition and from quick 
detection and treatment of conditions 
predisposing people to disease 
Possible slowing of progress in many 
fields of science and engineering (e.g., 
aviation and space, nuclear power, 
computers) 
Fresh ideas, research methods, and design 
approaches generated by convergence and 
combination of many fields, made possible by 
the nanoscale science and technology platforms. 
It will support rapid advancements in 
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